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ABSTRACT
The first essay tests the split signaling hypothesis by examining the reaction of sophisticated
investors to stock split announcements. Return-based tests of signaling used in earlier studies
produce conflicting results and have been criticized as unreliable. I bypass this criticism by
focusing on long-term post-split behavior of short sellers who are generally recognized as
sophisticated investors. Upon controlling for alternative hypotheses and conventional short selling
determinants, I show that short interest permanently declines in reaction to split announcements.
Furthermore, consistent with signaling, the degree of the decline is positively related to signal
strength and to the splitter’s level of information asymmetry. Overall, the results are consistent
with the view that firms use stock splits to relay positive value-relevant signals.
The second essay shows that the return predictability associated with retail trades cannot
be attributed to insider trades, as hypothesized by Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman (2012). Retail
purchases predict future abnormal returns, and the effect is amplified around insider purchases.
Similar results do not hold for insider sales. The results are consistent with retail investors trading
on primarily positive price-relevant information that overlaps with insider information sets. The
shared information appears to be of at least a medium-term nature. The results cannot be explained
by retail traders selectively mimicking insider trades.
The third essay analyzes the role of retail traders in stock pricing around quarterly earnings
announcements using a comprehensive and recent dataset. The data show that retail trading activity
predicts future earnings surprises, earnings announcement returns, and medium-term post-earnings
announcement returns. These results are not driven by insider trades prior to earnings
announcements. Most results are neither driven by individuals trading on the last day prior to
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earnings announcements, potentially including a group of hackers. Overall, the results are
consistent with retail investors trading on price-relevant information.
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1. STOCK SPLIT SIGNALLING: EVIDENCE FROM SHORT INTEREST
1.1. Introduction
The literature on stock split motives mainly focuses on two hypotheses: (i) signaling and (ii)
catering. The signaling hypothesis suggests that companies use splits to send positive valuerelevant signals to the market (Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman, 1984; Brennan and Copeland, 1988;
Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice, 1996). Alternatively, the catering hypothesis posits that firms split
to (a) attract small investors (Baker and Gallagher, 1980), (b) reward liquidity providers (Angel,
1997), and (c) time investors’ preferences for low-priced stocks (Baker, Greenwood, and Wurgler,
2009). The literature is, however, still far from an agreement as to whether the two abovementioned
hypotheses sufficiently explain cross-asset pervasiveness and historical persistence of stock splits.
For instance, the discussion in Weld, Michaely, Thaler, and Benartzi (2009) casts doubt on both
signaling and catering explanations and argues that splitting to lower prices is merely a societal
norm.
Studies that find support for the signaling hypothesis base their conclusions on the positive
return reaction to split announcements (Grinblatt et al., 1984; McNichols and Dravid, 1990). They
posit that the announcement return reflects positive changes in the opinion of the marginal investor;
hence, splits must relay positive signals about firms’ prospects. The criticism of this conclusion is
implied by a growing body of research on inefficient information processing by some investors. In
particular, Busse and Green (2002), Barber and Odean (2008), and Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009)
argue that the market may overreact to information in a corporate announcement if the
announcement attracts an unusual level of investor attention to the stock. Thus, if the positive split
announcement return represents a temporary overreaction to a sudden increase in a firm’s visibility,
conclusions based on positive announcement returns may be innately spurious.
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Sidestepping announcement returns, a group of signaling studies focuses on long-term postsplit performance. The shift to long-term measures is quite sensible, considering the market’s
ability to correct overreactions over time. If splits indeed relay positive signals, these studies expect
to find evidence of improved long-term post-split performance. Notable in this group are papers
by Lakonishok and Lev (1987), Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989), and Byun and Rozeff (2003)
who find no evidence of increases in earnings and no evidence of positive long-term returns after
stock splits, thus undermining the signaling hypothesis. In the meantime, studies that use alternative
techniques to measure long-term post-split returns (Ikenberry et al., 1996; Desai and Jain, 1997;
Ikenberry and Ramnath, 2002) find evidence of positive abnormal returns, consistent with
signaling. In a way, the split signaling debate is at an impasse due to a disagreement as to the proper
way to measure long-term returns.
We innovate by testing the split signaling hypothesis from a new angle that does not rely
solely on short-term or long-term return measurement. Instead, we focus on the post-split behavior
of sophisticated investors, as represented by short sellers. Our focus on short selling is prompted
by the literature that argues that short sellers possess superior investment skills (Dechow, Hutton,
Meulbroek, and Sloan, 2001; Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008; Engelberg, Reed, and
Ringgenberg, 2012; Rapach, Ringgenberg, and Zhou, 2016; Akbas, Boehmer, Erturk, and Sorescu,
2017).
We examine 5,979 splits that occur during a 31-year period from January 1988 through
December 2018. Throughout the entire sample period, our results are consistent with the hypothesis
that stock splits are interpreted by sophisticated investors as positive signals. Our most conservative
estimation shows a post-split drop in short interest of about 10%. Furthermore, the decline in short
interest is larger when the split signal is stronger. Specifically, short interest declines more in
reaction to (i) large splits and (ii) splits that bring stock prices to a level that is lower than that
2

achieved by the previous split – two characteristics that the literature recognizes as amplifiers of
positive signals (McNichols and Dravid, 1990; Conroy and Harris, 1999). In addition, split signals
have a more prominent effect when they are sent by firms with higher information asymmetries.
We test the results for robustness to the catering to small investors hypothesis of Baker and
Gallagher (1980). This hypothesis states that splits are meant to attract individual investors into
stock ownership by making shares nominally more affordable. Schultz (2000), Easley, O’Hara, and
Saar (2001), and Dyl and Elliott (2006) provide evidence consistent with post-split increases in
shareholdings of individual investors. In our setting, an increase in individual investor activity may
exacerbate idiosyncratic volatility (Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar, 2009) and thus increase
short selling costs (Duan, Hu, and McLean, 2010). As a result, short sellers may tend to avoid
recent splitters, and the decline in short interest may be driven by their aversion to idiosyncratic
volatility rather than by signalling. The data refute this possibility; controlling for the post-split
changes in idiosyncratic volatility does not alter the results. The results are also robust to
controlling for conventional short interest determinants such as institutional holdings, returns,
liquidity, and total volatility.
In addition, we conduct a set of robustness tests that eliminate confounding events that may
(i) affect the strength and clarity of the split signal or (ii) affect short interest independently of the
split signal. Since short selling is often used by index arbitrageurs, we test the results for
dependence on inclusions to and exclusions from the S&P 500 index. Our findings are also robust
to dropping a set of splits that are accompanied by changes in dividends and therefore may capture
dividend rather than split signals (Nayak and Prabhala, 2001).
Finally, we ask whether short sellers are successful at anticipating post-split long-term
returns. If they are not successful in this setting, their short positions may be reduced for other
reasons and could not be interpreted as evidence in favor of signaling. We show that the splits
3

associated with the largest declines in short interest are followed by long term positive returns,
measured with the calendar time abnormal return (CTAR) framework of Byun and Rozeff (2003).
Meanwhile, the remaining splits are followed by non-positive returns. This result holds for both
strong and weak split signals. Thus, although our evidence suggests that short sellers react to the
known split signal amplifiers, their understanding of the signal seems to be enhanced by the ability
to analyze information beyond that revealed in the split announcement. This result is consistent
with findings by Engelberg et al. (2012) who suggest that short sellers’ trading performance is
related to their ability to process publicly available information better than an average investor.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, our main contribution is in showing that
sophisticated investors infer positive signals from split announcements. As such, our approach
avoids relying solely on return measurements that have produced conflicting results in earlier
studies. Second, we show that short sellers’ reaction to split announcements is more consistent with
signaling after the financial crisis, possibly due to weakening of alternative split motives. Thus,
our results are consistent with existence of a time-variant set of split motives. We propose that the
lack of consistent evidence on split signaling in earlier studies may be due to the fact that earlier
samples contain a number of splits that were initiated for non-signaling reasons. Finally, we find
some evidence that the decline in short interest may be based on information that is beyond that
derived from the conventional amplifiers of split signals. Our results are thus consistent with
research that argues that short sellers possess superior ability to process value-relevant information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the literature on
stock splits and short seller informedness. Section 1.3 describes the data and sample. Section 1.4
contains the main empirical results. Section 1.5 concludes.
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1.2. Background
The finance literature identifies two most likely motives for stock splits: (i) signaling, and (ii)
catering to investors and/or intermediaries. The literature, however, is far from a consensus as to
whether the two motives are able to explain cross-asset pervasiveness and historical persistence of
stock splits (Rozeff, 1998; Weld et al., 2009). Although the motives behind split decisions are
somewhat unclear, there is abundant evidence of nontrivial costs associated with stock splits.
Among these are direct administrative/legal cost, the costs of getting a split approved by the
shareholders, the additional per-share listing and maintenance fees levied by some stock exchanges,
and the per-share franchise taxes levied by the states of incorporation. Together, these costs may
often add up to millions of dollars. Also notable are higher trading costs and lower liquidity in the
post-split months (Conroy, Harris, and Benet, 1990; and Kadapakkam, Krishnamurthy, and Tse,
2005) that may have an adverse effect on the cost of capital.1 Thus, with the obvious costs and
unclear benefits, stock splits remain one of the less understood corporate decisions.
Surveyed CFOs cite the expansion of the shareholder base as the main split motive (e.g.,
Baker and Gallagher, 1980). The per-share price reduction that results from a split makes a stock
more affordable to small investors, attracting them to the realm of stock ownership. Schultz (2000),
Easley et al. (2001), and Dyl and Elliott (2006) find empirical evidence consistent with this
proposition, showing that the numbers of small transactions, uninformed traders, and small
shareholders increase post-split. In the meantime, Weld et al. (2009) examine a long time series of
splits and argue that the clientele explanation is not sensible when one takes into account changes
in individual nominal incomes. Additionally, attempts to attract small shareholders are unable to

1

The direction of liquidity changes subsequent to stock splits is subject to debate. While Conroy et al. (1990), Easley
et al. (2001), and Kadapakkam et al. (2005) argue that liquidity, as measured by bid-ask spreads, declines post-split,
Lin, Singh, and Yu (2009) show that, if measured as incidence of no trading, liquidity increases post-split.
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explain mutual fund splits (Rozeff, 1998). Mutual fund shares are infinitely divisible, and therefore
splitting them is not necessary to make the fund affordable to small investors. Curiously, mutual
funds regularly split their shares.
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) and Angel (1997) propose a different angle to the catering
hypothesis. They suggest that firms split to increase the tick-to-price ratio and hence the profits
from providing liquidity in their stock. In addition, by increasing the number of shares required to
transact a particular dollar amount, splits increase profits from intermediating institutional trades
(Chemmanur, Hu, and Huang, 2015), as institutional trading fees are a function of the number of
transacted shares. In exchange for higher profitability, market makers reward splitters with better
liquidity and exert more effort to promote the firm’s stock.2 Angel suggests that the importance of
the catering to intermediaries should diminish upon reduction in the minimum tick size. Whereas
a 2-for-1 split has the potential to double market making revenues under any tick size regime; the
amount of revenue being doubled is much smaller under decimals than it is under the eighths or
the sixteenths.
Signaling is another widely studied split motive. Return reaction to stock splits is usually
positive, which Grinblatt et al. (1984) interpret as evidence that splits are positive signals. In a
theory model by Brennan and Copeland (1988), undervalued firms credibly signal their higher
quality by splitting the stock. McNichols and Dravid (1990) suggest that firms signal private
information with their choice of a split factor, with larger splits being interpreted as more positive
signals. Conroy and Harris (1999) show that seasoned splitters, and especially seasoned splitters
that split to prices that are lower than those achieved by their previous split, send stronger signals.

2

Schultz (2000) reports evidence consistent with such promotional activity.
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According to Lakonishok and Lev (1987) and Weld et al. (2009), stock splits are merely
mechanical adjustments toward a commonly accepted price benchmark. Such adjustments,
although costly, are in line with Akerlof’s (2007) proposition that a number of economic decisions
are driven by societal norms. Weld et al. (2009) argue that, in North America, a nominal stock price
of around $40 per share is one such norm. They conclude that the norms explanation is the only
split motive that is able to explain splits persistence over time. Bae, Bhattacharya, Kang, and Rhee
(2019) provide further evidence that nominal price anchors are a global phenomenon. Our results
pose a challenge to norms as the only explanation for stock splits, as the decline in short interest in
reaction to split announcements is not easily explained in the norms framework.
We are not the first to study short interest in relation to stock splits. Kadiyala and Vetsuypens
(2002) do not find significant changes in short interest around splits in a relatively small sample of
296 splitters during a 4-year period in the mid-1990s. With a larger sample, we are able to show
significant and meaningful declines in short interest.

1.3. Data and sample
Our sample includes all NYSE and NASDAQ ordinary common shares (CRSP exchange
codes 1 and 3 and share codes 10 and 11) from January 1988 through December 2018. For each
security, we identify splits as distributions with the CRSP event code 5523. We exclude reverse
splits and stock dividends that we identify as distribution events with split factors less than 0.25.
We obtain monthly short interest data from the NYSE (January 1988 through December
2007), NASDAQ (June 1988 through July 2007), 3 and Compustat (January 1973 through
December 2018). Short interest is normalized by the number of outstanding shares and winsorized

3

Short interest data are missing for all NASDAQ stocks in February and July of 1990. Similarly to earlier studies, we
use linear extrapolation to estimate short interest for these two months.
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at the 1% level. When there are discrepancies between the data from the exchanges and the adjusted
records from Compustat, we keep the exchange data because the source is more direct. Whereas
the data from the exchanges are comprehensive, the short interest data from Compustat cover
virtually no NASDAQ stocks prior to July 2003. After 2003, almost all NASDAQ stocks are
included. For the NYSE stocks, Compustat short interest coverage gradually increases from about
13% of splitting companies in 1973 to 57% in 1988 and 99% in 2006. To avoid a potential data
selection bias in the missing observations before 1988, we restrict the analysis to the period 19882018 where joint coverage is near 100% throughout the sample period. Nevertheless, our results
are robust to including the data from 1973.
In Table 1.1, for every sample year, we report the following statistics: (i) the number of splits;
(ii) the percent of splits that are large (a split factor of two or greater); (iii) the percent of seasoned
splitters (firms that have split at least once prior to the current split); (iv) the average stock price;
and (v) the percent short interest, SIi,t. An average of 193 firms split their stock every year during
our sample period. Notably, the early sample years are considerably different from the later years,
with the number of splits declining in 2001, concurrently with decimalization and the economic
recession. Consistent with the findings of Minnick and Raman (2014), the number of splits declines
even further in 2008, during the global financial crisis, and does not rebound to the pre-crisis levels
even a decade later, at the end of the sample period. These structural breaks motivate sub-period
analyses of 1988-2000, 2001-2007, and 2008-2018 for the main empirical results.
Statistics in Table 1.1 also show that the shares of large splits and seasoned splitters are both
increasing over time where the shares of seasoned splitters increase gradually across the subperiods.
Large splits, on the other hand, are increasingly common except for a drop in 2001, resulting in
comparable averages for the first two subperiods and a meaningful increase from 54% to 72% in
the last 2008-2018 period. These sample features motivate subperiod analysis for subsequent tests
8

that rely on stratifying the sample by these two characteristics. We also note that stock prices rise
exponentially across the sample period, with increasing growth rates as the number of splits
declines.
Furthermore, the statistics show that short interest, SI, increases steadily for most of the
sample period, starting at 0.60% in 1988, reaching a peak of 5.90% in 2008 and then stabilizing
around 4.60%. This pattern is not surprising, as institutional trading, which is the primary driver of
short selling (Boehmer et al., 2008), intensifies in the years leading up to the financial crisis (French,
2008), with some institutions (i.e., hedge funds) notoriously relying on short sales. Although not
surprising, the strong time trend in short interest presents a methodological challenge. With the
unconditional annual growth in short interest being 6.87% (Table 1.1), and our event-windows
capturing close to two years of data, the tests need to control for this strong time trend.
To adjust for the time trend, we identify, for each splitter, a matched firm that does not split
during the event window and has a set of split-relevant characteristics that closely resemble those
of the splitter. Since short interest in all firms is affected by the upward trend,
differencing SIs for the splitters and matched non-splitters should eliminate the trend. In addition,
the matched-firm approach should reduce possible endogeneity in the short sellers’ decision to
reduce positions and the firm’s decision to split. For instance, stocks that are becoming more liquid
are more likely to split and such stocks may simultaneously become less attractive to short (Diether,
Lee, and Werner, 2009). We thus address both time trends and endogeneity concerns by evaluating
the difference-in-difference between splitters and stocks which closely resemble them in terms of
changes in liquidity and other split and short interest determinants.
To find suitable matches, we use the two-step propensity score methodology of Heckman,
Ichimura, and Todd (1997). In the first step, we model the binary split decision as a function of
observable split and short interest determinants, and in the second step, we use the predicted split
9

probabilities to find matched non-splitters that have similar split propensities. The details of the
propensity score matching are discussed in the Appendix. Having paired splitters with their nonsplitting matches, we proceed to inquire whether there is evidence of changes in short interest
around split announcements.

1.4. Short interest around stock split announcements
1.4.1. Univariate analysis
To gain initial insight into short seller behavior around stock splits, we begin with a
conventional event study methodology. For every splitter, we compute an abnormal short interest
statistic, ASIi,t, during a 21-month event window centered on the split announcement month. To
compute ASI, short interest in the event window months is compared to the average short interest
computed during the control period that spans months t-20 through t-11:
𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 10−1 ∑−20
−11 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ,

(1.1)

where SIi,t is the short interest ratio of firm i in month t. Next, we compute our main variable of
interest, ∆𝑖𝑗 𝑆𝐼𝑡 , as the difference between abnormal short interest of the splitting firm i and its
matching non-splitting firm j. To estimate the pure announcement effect, we limit the analysis to
the splits, for which the announcement and the split event are separated by at least one month.4 The
results are organized in a [-10; +10]-month event window centered on the month of the split
announcement. Month 0 represents the first post-announcement short interest record.
Figure 1.1 reports the average ∆𝑖𝑗 𝑆𝐼𝑡 around split announcements. By construction, the
difference in short interest between the splitters and their matches is rather stable in the pre-split
period. After the splits, short interest decreases substantially; by 0.12% after one month. This

4

We relax this restriction in the regression models that follow, as these models focus on long-term split effects.
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decline stabilizes around -0.30% after several months, representing a relative drop of over 10%
when compared to the mean short interest of 2.57% in the month before the split. This is a
substantial decline, especially given the fact that not all short sellers are bearish about the specific
stock they short and are thus unlikely to reduce their positions when positive firm-specific
information becomes available. For example, an investor may buy inverse ETFs to express macro
views or to hedge long positions, and the ETF may subsequently short the securities comprising its
benchmark (Cheng and Madhavan, 2009; Huang, O’Hara, and Zhong, 2021). As another example,
investors may simply be risk averse and buy put options to hedge their downside risk, possibly
resulting in the option market maker shorting the underlying stock for hedging purposes (Battalio
and Schultz, 2011). The preliminary results in Figure 1.1 are thus consistent with split signaling,
as stock splits result in a significant and permanent decline in short interest.

1.4.2. Multivariate analysis
Although the decline in short interest is consistent with signaling, it may be alternatively
attributed to, or partly influenced by, split-induced changes in widely known short interest
determinants. Although our matching procedure controls for the pre-split changes in these
determinants, it does not control for the post-split changes. To provide a background, in Table 1.2,
we report pre- and post-split changes in short interest and the following short interest determinants:
returns, volatility, illiquidity, and institutional ownership. All variables are computed as differences
between abnormal levels of the respective variables for splitters and matched non-splitters.
The results presented in Table 1.2 confirm our previous assertion, as the relative levels of all
covariates are much smaller in absolute value in the pre-split period compared to the post-split
period. The only exception is institutional ownership, but the economic significance of a 0.45%
difference is marginal given that average institutional ownership is over 50%. Economically, the
11

most significant pre-split difference is in abnormal returns, which implies that the splitters have a
somewhat higher abnormal return than their matches. However, the difference is not statistically
significant and post-split abnormal returns are roughly 4 times as large. Corroborating Conroy et
al. (1990) and Kadapakkam et al. (2005), post-split illiquidity increases by about 14%, and postsplit volatility increases by about 16% consistent with Koski (1998).
Since the post-split changes in abnormal returns, volatility, illiquidity, and institutional
ownership may affect short interest in the post-split period and therefore may affect the univariate
results reported in Figure 1.1, we proceed to the multivariate tests. In Table 1.3, we report the
estimated coefficients from the following difference-in-differences model:
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,

(1.2)

where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the number of shares in short positions of firm i in month t divided by the number of
shares outstanding; POSTi,t is the indicator variable equal to 0 in the pre-split months and equal to
1 in the split and the post-split months; and SPLITTERi is the indicator variable equal to 1 for the
splitters and 0 for the matched non-splitters. The 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 vector of control variables includes (i) ARi,t –
abnormal return; (ii) VOLATi,t – volatility estimated as the average daily (high price – low
price)/low price; (iii) ILLIQUIDi,t – illiquidity estimated as the average daily bid-ask spread as in
Corwin and Schultz (2012); and (iv) INSTi,t – institutional ownership computed as the number of
shares in institutional holdings reported via 13-F forms and scaled by the number of shares
outstanding. We further adjust the model for firm and year fixed effects, so we do not include the
SPLITTER variable by itself in model (1.2) and we do not estimate the intercept.
In specification [1] of Table 1.3, we begin with a baseline specification that includes POST
and SPLITTER×POST. The effects of a split on the splitters compared to the matched firms is
captured by SPLITTER×POST. Short interest declines by 0.21% after a stock split. The magnitude
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of this estimate is comparable to the univariate case discussed in Figure 1.1. In turn, POST captures
the time trend for the matched non-splitters around the splits in their matches.
In specification [2], we expand the model to include the short interest determinants discussed
above. Controlling for these does not change the main result – short interest declines after the splits
– further corroborating the signaling hypothesis. The remaining coefficients indicate that higher
volatility and institutional ownership correspond to higher levels of short interest. The opposite
relation holds for returns and illiquidity, which are negatively related to short interest. These results
corroborate the findings of Diether et al. (2009) with respect to volatility and expectations of
Kadiyala and Vetsuypens (2002) with respect to illiquidity. They are also consistent with the prior
literature that reports greater short interest in stocks held by institutional investors.
Baker and Gallagher (1980) report that managers commonly cite attracting small investors
as the main motive for stocks splits. Schultz (2000), Easley et al. (2001) and Dyl and Elliott (2006)
find that small investor activity and ownership significantly increase after splits. We must,
therefore, consider the possibility that the post-split decline in short interest is driven by changes
in small investor activity. On the one hand, greater individual ownership may result in more
mispricing and more profitable arbitrage opportunities for short sellers. On the other hand, retail
investors increase stock’s idiosyncratic volatility (Brandt et al., 2009), which in turn increases short
sellers’ costs and may lead to reductions in their positions (Duan et al., 2010). Thus, it is important
to test if the decline in short interest is affected by changes in the level of retail investor activity
after the splits. We use idiosyncratic volatility as in Brandt et al. (2009) as a proxy for retail investor
activity.
Specifications [3] and [4] include idiosyncratic volatility IVOLATi,t, estimated as in Brandt,
et al. (2009). Its correlation coefficient with VOLATi,t is 0.60, raising the possibility of collinearity.
To address this concern, we exclude VOLATi,t, in specification [3] and include both in specification
13

[4]. The estimated coefficient on idiosyncratic volatility is positive and significant in specification
[3], but insignificant in [4]. Most importantly, the decline in short interest continues to be observed
when idiosyncratic volatility is controlled for.
As a robustness check, we follow Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) in collapsing the
pre-split and post-split time periods to address potential correlation in the standard errors of our
estimates. Specifically, we include only two observations in the [t-10, t+10] window for each
splitter and each matched non-splitter; one averaged over the pre-announcement months and the
other averaged over the post-announcement months. The coefficients of interest, i.e., those on
SPLITTER×POST, reported in Panel B of Table 1.3 are similar to the main analysis and remain

statistically significant.
In summary, the multivariate results indicate that post-split decreases in short interest are not
driven solely by the changes in conventional short interest determinants, corroborating the
signaling explanation. The most conservative estimation points to a relative drop in short interest
of nearly 10% (0.172 relative to 1.77, the mean short interest of splitters in specification [3] of
Table 1.3 in the month before the split).

1.4.3. Additional tests of signaling
Our tests so far imply that short seller behavior is consistent with receiving a positive signal
from stock splits. In this section, we look for additional confirmation of the signaling explanation
by examining short interest in the signaling framework proposed by earlier studies. In particular,
we rely on findings of McNichols and Dravid (1990) and Conroy and Harris (1999), who show
that larger splits and splits by seasoned splitters (especially to prices that are lower than those
achieved through the previous split) serve as stronger signals.
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In addition, we test the generally accepted premise of the signaling theory that reactions to
signals should be stronger for firms with greater information asymmetry (Desai and Jain, 1997);
for such firms the utility of the signal is greater. The literature proposes a number of information
asymmetry proxies, from which we choose: (i) the dispersion of analyst opinion, (ii) the firm’s
share of R&D expenditures, and (iii) the firm’s percentage of intangible assets.
To test these expectations in our setting, we estimate the following equation:
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 +
𝛽4 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡

(1.3)

where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is defined as previously, and 𝛿𝑖 is the indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if a
split or a splitting firm has a specific characteristic. We consider the following characteristics: (i)
large split (similarly to McNichols and Dravid (1990) and Byun and Rozeff (2003), we define large
splits as 2:1 and larger); (ii) firm is a seasoned splitter (similarly to Conroy and Harris (1999),
firms that have split their shares in the past are considered seasoned splitters); (iii) splitting to a
lower price as compared to that achieved through the previous split; (iv) high dispersion of analyst
opinion (firms in the three upper deciles by dispersion); (v and vi) high R&D expenditures as a
share of all expenditures and high intangible assets as a share of total assets (firms in the three
upper deciles by, respectively, R&D and intangibles). Control variables are defined as in equation
(1.2), and the difference-in-differences regression structure is preserved.
The estimated coefficients from various equation (1.3) specifications are reported in Table
1.4. In the signaling context, we are mainly interested in the coefficient of the interaction term
POST×SPLITTER×δ, which captures the post-split differences between the splitters and their
matches for various characteristics discussed above. For instance, the negative coefficient on
POST×SPLITTER×δ, where δ is equal to 1 for large splits, indicates that short interest declines by
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0.26% more in response to large splits relative to small splits. The largest incremental short interest
decline of 0.51% is observed for high R&D firms, one of our proxies of information asymmetry.
Larger splits, splits by seasoned splitters, and splits to lower than previous prices have
stronger negative effects on short interest. When it comes to firm characteristics, all information
asymmetry proxies also have expected signs. Specifically, firms with high dispersion in analysts’
opinion, firms with high R&D expenses, and firms with high levels of intangible assets – all proxies
for high information asymmetry – send stronger signals by splitting their shares. Overall, these
results are consistent with the signaling hypothesis.

1.4.4. Alternative explanations, sub-period results, and confounding events
In this sub-section, we split the sample period into three sub-periods to examine whether the
evidence of signalling changes over time. In addition, we carry out a series of robustness checks
to determine if our main result is affected by two potentially confounding events: inclusions in and
exclusions from the S&P 500 index and dividend changes.
We noted earlier that the number of splits permanently decreases after decimalization and
again after the financial crisis, and that average short interest appears to have reached an
equilibrium after rising from the start of the sample until the crisis. It is therefore useful to ask if
our results hold throughout the sample period. We might expect that the evidence of signaling
intensifies after decimalization as the incidence of splits that are motivated by catering to
intermediaries should reduce.
Using 2001 and 2008 as cut-offs, we estimate the models (1.2) and (1.3) and report the
coefficients of interest in Table 1.5. We find that for 1988-2000, all the results still hold except for
stocks with a high analyst dispersion. Interestingly, the post-split decline in short interest after the
financial crisis is over four times as large as in the earlier periods, consistent with the possibility
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that the number of stocks splits driven by non-signalling motives has declined. The statistical
significance is lost for many of the tests of split signaling strength in the latter two subperiods.
However, the sub-period analysis shows that the full sample results for large splits and seasoned
splitters are not driven by time trends in their relative occurrence.
We note that the coefficients on illiquidity become insignificant after decimalization. This
result might be attributable to the fact that the accuracy of our illiquidity measure drops after
decimalization, as noted by Corwin and Schultz (2012). In unreported results, we find that when
we estimate illiquidity by the CRSP spread (in cents), the coefficient remains negative and
significant in the 1988-2000 and 2001-2007 subperiods. It does lose statistical significance in the
last period 2008-2018, but the magnitude is slightly greater in absolute value than either of the first
two subperiods. With the CRSP spread as illiquidity measure, the estimated post-split decline in
short interest of splitters is slightly larger.
Short positions are often used by index arbitrageurs for hedging; if an index funds trades
below its intrinsic value, arbitrageurs can buy the index and short its constituents for a riskless
profit. In addition, short sales constraints may weaken after index inclusion as index funds lend out
holdings as well as institutions that start including the stock in various benchmarks. Thus, if a split
is accompanied by an index inclusion (exclusion), we expect an increase (decrease) in short
positions of these market participants. Panel A of Table 1.6 shows that about 2% of splits are
accompanied by an inclusion into the S&P 500 index during the 21-month event window that
surrounds split announcements. On the other hand, exclusions rarely occur during the event
window, we only observe one exclusion.
Nayak and Prabhala (2001) caution that the magnitude of split signals may be misestimated
because split announcements often occur simultaneously with the announcements of dividend
changes. In our sample, 2,092 split announcements (about 53% of all splits) are adjacent to
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dividend changes. To check if our results are driven by split signals instead of dividend signals, we
re-estimate the signaling model for the sub-sample of splits that are not accompanied by dividend
changes.
In Table 1.6, we re-estimate equations (1.2) and (1.3) excluding the above-mentioned
confounding events, with the latter equation estimated for large splits. The results support our
previous conclusions. Short interest declines for the splitters relative to matches, and exclusively
for large splits. Eliminating splits accompanied by dividend changes or S&P in- and exclusions
results in a smaller coefficient on POST×SPLITTER than that reported in Table 1.3, consistent with
the fact that some signals might be attributable to dividend announcements. In contrast, the large
split results become even stronger in magnitude when we eliminate confounding events, consistent
with the split ratio being more important as a signal when there is no concurrent change in the
stock’s dividend. Overall, the results consistent with the signaling hypothesis are robust to
controlling for confounding events.

1.4.5. Post-split returns
Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) use the buy-and-hold returns, BHARs, and find strong
evidence that post-split long-term returns are positive. Using an arguably more robust methodology
of calendar time abnormal returns, CTARs, Byun and Rozeff (2003) find that splits are usually not
followed by long-term positive abnormal returns, thus undermining the signaling hypothesis. Our
tests suggest that sophisticated investors behave consistently with signaling, as they reduce short
positions in anticipation of positive post-split returns. If such positive returns do not ensue, our
argument of short sellers’ superior ability to analyze value-relevant information is untenable, at
least in relation to stock splits.
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Since Byun and Rozeff’s CTAR approach produces more conservative return estimates
compared to those from the BHAR approach, we estimate CTARs to test short sellers’ long-term
return forecasting ability. In month t, CTARt is the average abnormal return for all sample firms
that have effected a split within the prior 12, 24, or 36 months. As in Nain and Yao (2013), CTARs
are measured as the estimated alpha from the 4-factor model:5
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝑠𝑖 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,

(1.4)

where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is firm i’s monthly return, including dividends, in month t; 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is one-month Treasury
bill return; and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of all NYSE and NASDAQ
stocks. The 𝑆𝑀𝐵 and 𝐻𝑀𝐿 factors are defined as in Fama and French (1993) and the momentum
factor is defined as in Carhart (1997). The models are estimated over the entire sample period 19882018.
As Byun and Rozeff, we estimate CTARs separately for large and small splits. Additionally,
within split size groups, we estimate CTARs for all splitters in the sample and then, separately, (i)
for the splits followed by the largest declines in short interest in the five months following the split,
∆ijSIlarge, and (ii) for the splits followed by the smallest changes in short interest, ∆ijSIsmall. We
choose five months because Figure 1.1 shows that most of the post-split short interest decline
happens within this period. The largest (smallest) changes in short interest are defined as those
below (above) the 30th (70th) percentile of all relative changes.
The results reported in Table 1.7 are consistent with the notion that short sellers have superior
ability to analyze corporate signals. First, the data show that, in the cross-section, splits are
followed by abnormal long-term returns. Second, and more importantly, when we focus on splits

5

We use the 4-factor model, because the splitters are characterized by sizeable pre-split returns, and thus price
momentum may relate to subsequent returns. Of particular concern is short sellers potentially decreasing their positions
for splits with larger pre-split returns because of the associated stronger momentum effects.
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that are accompanied by significant declines in short interest (columns titled ∆ijSIlarge), we find that
short sellers are able to identify splits that represent true positive signals. In the meantime, for the
group of splits followed by the smallest changes in short interest, post-split CTARs are statistically
insignificant. This result obtains for large and small splits and for the 12-, 24- or 36-month portfolio
inclusion windows. Overall, these results are consistent with signaling and with short sellers’
superior ability to interpret the signals.

1.5. Conclusions
In this study, we test the split signaling hypothesis of Brennan and Copeland (1988) from an
angle that avoids relying solely on return measurement. Specifically, we focus on the post-split
actions of a group of sophisticated investors, short sellers, and ask whether their behavior is
consistent with receiving a positive value-relevant signal from a stock split.
Our findings suggest that splits are interpreted by short sellers as positive signals, as short
interest usually decreases by about 10% in reaction to split announcements. The decline in short
interest is larger when the split signal is stronger as represented by (i) larger split factors, (ii)
seasoned splitters, and (iii) lower post-split prices. In addition, split signals have a more prominent
effect when they are sent by firms with greater information asymmetries.
We study 5,979 splits during a 31-year period from January 1988 through December 2018.
Our results corroborate the signaling hypothesis throughout the entire sample period. The results
are unchanged in a series of robustness checks that account for split-related changes in individual
investor activity and the conventional short interest determinants such as abnormal returns,
institutional holdings, liquidity, and volatility. In addition, the results are robust to eliminating a
set of confounding events that may (i) affect the strength and clarity of the split signal or (ii) affect
short interest levels. Sub-period analyses show that the short interest decline is apparent throughout
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the sample period, with a stronger decline after the financial crisis of 2008. Given that the number
of splits concurrently declined, the results suggest that it is mostly splits driven by non-signaling
motives that have disappeared.
We also ask whether short sellers are successful at predicting long-term returns that follow
stock splits. We show that split announcements that are associated with the largest declines in short
interest are followed by positive calendar time abnormal returns, CTARs. Meanwhile, splits that
do not lead to a significant decline in short interest are followed by zero abnormal returns. Thus,
although the evidence suggests that short sellers react to the known split signal amplifiers, their
understanding of split signals seems to be enhanced by the ability to analyze information beyond
that revealed in the split announcement.
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1.6. Appendix: Propensity Score Matching
To identify the composition of the split decision model, we refer to the existing literature for
guidance. We use a combination of the binary models of Lakonishok and Lev (1987), Nayak and
Prabhala (2001), and Baker et al. (2009). In particular, we model split decisions as a function of (i)
the price ratio – the relation of the firm’s pre-split price to the average market price, (ii) the presplit price runup, (iii) the pre-split average monthly change in stock return volatility, (iv) the presplit average monthly change in stock illiquidity, (v) the pre-split average monthly changes in
institutional ownership, (vi) firm size, (vii, viii) dummy variables to distinguish between the tick
size regimes (eighths, sixteenths, and decimals), and (ix) a post-financial crisis dummy variable.
In additional specifications, we include the level of short interest and the pre-split average monthly
changes in short interest.
We offer the following reasoning for this model structure. As argued by Lakonishok and Lev
(1987) and Weld et al. (2009), firms with high price ratios are likely to lower their prices by
splitting. Such decisions are often conditional on the relatively rapid price runup and company size,
with larger companies often opting for higher nominal prices as suggested by Nayak and Prabhala
(2001). More recently, Baker et al. (2009) introduce volatility as a split determinant, arguing that
firms with high volatility should be reluctant to force their prices down. To allow firms’ split
decision criteria to change with tick size and after the recent financial crisis, we also add indicator
variables that distinguish between three tick size regimes (eighths, sixteenths, and decimals) and
for before and after the financial crisis.
Since short interest is our main variable of focus, we require that the splitters and their
matches have similar conditions for establishing short interest positions. Hence, in addition to the
split determinants, we control for the conventional short interest determinants: institutional
holdings and liquidity. Institutional ownership is often used as a proxy for short selling constraints
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(Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter, 2005), whereas liquidity is deemed to be an important short selling
determinant, although the direction of the relation is not yet settled in the literature. Whereas
Kadiyala and Vetsuypens (2002) suggest that, in the long run, short sellers tend to avoid illiquid
stocks due to higher risk of unwinding positions in such stocks, Diether et al. (2009) view short
sellers as short-term liquidity providers who seek out illiquid stocks.
In summary, as the first step of the propensity score matching procedure, we estimate the
following logistic regression:
Pr (spliti,t = 1) =

α + β1 SIi,t-1 + β2 ∆SIi,[t- κ; t-1] + β3 PRATIOi,t-1 + β4 ARi,[t-10; t-1] +
β5 ∆VOLATi,[t-10; t-1] + β6 ∆ILLIQi,[t-10; t-1] + β7 ∆INST,[t-10; t-1] +
β8 NYSEDi,t-1 + β9 SIXTNTHSt + β10 DECIMALSt +
β11 POSTCRISISt + εi,t,

(1.A1)

where the binary dependent variable spliti,t is equal to 1 if firm i announces a split in month t and
is equal to 0 otherwise; PRATIOi,t-1 is firm i’s price ratio computed as its price in the pre-split
announcement month divided by the average price for all sample stocks other than i; ARi,[t-10;t-1] is
the buy-and-hold abnormal return that represents the price runup; ∆VOLATi,[t-10;t-1] is the monthly
change in stock i’s daily volatility estimated as the average daily (high price – low price)/low price;
∆ILLIQi,[t-10;t-1] is the mean monthly change in stock i’s illiquidity estimated as the average daily
bid-ask spread as in Corwin and Schultz (2012); ∆INST,[t-10; t-1] is the mean monthly change in
institutional ownership of stock i, where institutional ownership is computed as the number of
shares in institutional holdings reported via Form 13-F, scaled by the number of shares outstanding;
NYSEDi,t-1 is the NYSE market capitalization decile that firm i belongs to; SIXTNTHSt and
DECIMALSt are indicator variables that identify minimum tick size regimes, with the eighths being
the base regime; and POSTCRISISt is an indicator variable that equals one from the year 2008
onward. The monthly buy-and-hold abnormal return is estimated as in Ikenberry and Ramnath
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(2002), using the Fama and French 3 factor model as the benchmark return. Daily stock volatility
is estimated as the average daily (high price – low price)/low price. Illiquidity is estimated as the
average daily bid-ask spread as in Corwin and Schultz (2012).
Specification [1] of Table 1.A1 reports the marginal effects obtained from the estimated
coefficients. Although the economic interpretation of split determinants is not the main focus of
this study, we briefly discuss them to highlight similarities with prior research. Split likelihood
increases in the price ratio, price runup, liquidity (decreases in illiquidity), and institutional
ownership, while it declines upon the switch to sixteenths and, further, upon the switch to decimals
and after the financial crisis of 2008. Changes in volatility are only marginally relevant for firms’
split decisions. Finally, large firms are less likely to split, consistent with the cross-sectional pattern,
in which the median stock price for large firms is $41.88 whereas it is just $7.85 for small firms.
Overall, the estimated effects corroborate prior research and our expectations.
In order to ensure that the environment, in which short sellers operate, is as similar as
possible between the splitters and their matches, we also want to match on the short interest level
and pre-split changes. In specifications [2] and [3] of Table 1.A1, we add the level of short interest
and the average monthly changes in short interest in, respectively, five and ten pre-split months as
explanatory variables in model (1.1). The estimated effects on the level of short interest and the
change in short interest are insignificant. However, to improve our matching procedure in terms of
short interest, which is our main variable of interest, we opt to use specification [3] as the propensity
score model to match splitting firms to matching non-splitting firms.
Having estimated the propensity to split for each firm in each sample month, we continue to
the second step of Heckman et al. (1997) procedure that involves finding suitable matches for the
splitting firms. We match (without replacement) every firm i that announces a split in month t with
a non-splitting firm j, whose estimated propensity to split in month t-1 is the closest to that of firm
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i’s. To be eligible for matching, firm j must not split during the 10 months before or during the 10
months after the split by firm i. Having paired splitters with their non-splitting matches, we proceed
to inquire whether there is evidence of changes in short interest after the split announcements.
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Table 1.1. Sample statistics
The table contains sample statistics for a 31-year sample period that spans January 1988 through
December 2018. We report (i) the number of splits; (ii) percentage of large splits; (iii) percentage of
splits by seasoned splitters; (iv) short interest, SI; and (v) stock price. The sample includes all NYSE
and NASDAQ common shares (CRSP exchange codes 1 and 3 and share codes 10 and 11). Splits are
defined as distributions with CRSP event code 5523 excluding reverse splits, stock dividends, splits
occurring within 1 year of the last eligible split, and splits with missing announcement dates. Large
splits are defined as those with CRSP split factor of at least 1 (i.e., 2:1 and larger splits). Seasoned
splitters are defined as firms that have split at least once prior to the current split. Short interest, SI, is
the number of shares in short positions scaled by the number of shares outstanding.
Year
# splits
% large splits
% seasoned
Stock price
SI, %
1988
208
36.54
58.65
15.72
0.60
1989
290
44.14
59.66
15.63
0.54
1990
173
57.23
57.80
13.89
0.74
1991
238
48.32
64.71
15.13
0.82
1992
378
47.09
59.26
16.90
0.85
1993
416
49.28
53.61
19.15
0.98
1994
300
54.33
49.33
18.58
1.12
1995
407
54.05
47.42
21.07
1.20
1996
451
55.43
50.11
22.95
1.21
1997
456
54.82
57.02
25.26
1.40
1998
382
60.99
58.64
28.71
1.57
1999
343
68.51
47.23
29.19
1.47
2000
278
74.82
46.40
28.84
1.52
2001
158
41.77
66.46
28.44
1.85
2002
168
49.40
60.71
30.55
2.34
2003
208
43.75
59.13
32.67
2.52
2004
238
56.72
61.34
39.97
2.81
2005
251
58.96
64.54
41.13
3.26
2006
185
56.22
62.16
44.51
4.01
2007
117
68.38
65.81
51.36
5.00
2008
33
78.79
72.73
48.43
5.90
2009
13
69.23
69.23
40.02
3.97
2010
43
46.51
74.42
50.76
4.28
2011
52
76.92
61.54
54.52
4.34
2012
39
82.05
69.23
59.05
4.43
2013
50
70.00
76.00
76.90
4.16
2014
46
82.61
58.70
87.76
4.52
2015
18
100.00
50.00
92.51
4.70
2016
10
60.00
90.00
94.04
4.79
2017
19
57.89
73.68
117.39
4.82
2018
11
63.64
90.91
141.94
4.71
Mean
193
60.04
61.98
45.26
2.79
Mean 1988-2000
333
54.17
53.51
20.85
1.08
Mean 2001-2007
190
53.46
62.75
38.37
3.11
Mean 2008-2018
30
71.60
71.49
78.48
4.60
Total
5,988
% annual growth
7.36
6.87
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Table 1.2. Short interest and covariates around split announcements
The table reports differences between splitting firms and their matches for the following covariates:
(i) ∆𝑖𝑗 SI computed as the mean difference in abnormal short interest, 𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 10−1 ∑−20
−11 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 ,
where SIi,t is the number of firm i’s shares in short positions in month t scaled by the number of shares
outstanding; (ii) ∆𝑖𝑗 AR is computed as the difference in abnormal returns estimated with the Fama
and French three-factor model; (iii) ∆𝑖𝑗 VOLAT computed as the difference in abnormal volatility,
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − 10−1 ∑−20
−11 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is estimated as (high price – low price)/low price;
(iv) ∆𝑖𝑗 ILLIQ computed as the difference in abnormal bid-ask spreads, 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 −
10−1 ∑−20
−11 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 , where 𝐼𝐿𝐿𝐼𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is estimated as in Corwin and Schultz (2012), with negative
spreads set to zero; and (v) ∆𝑖𝑗 INST computed as the difference in abnormal institutional ownership,
INSTi,t – 10−1 ∑−20
−11 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡 . The results are computed in the [t-10; t+10]-month window. The preannouncement period is identified as pre, and the post-announcement period as post. t-statistics are
in parentheses.
∆𝑖𝑗 SI
∆𝑖𝑗 AR
∆𝑖𝑗 VOLAT
∆𝑖𝑗 ILLIQ
∆𝑖𝑗 INST

pre
post

-0.01%
(-0.13)
-0.26%**
(-2.44)

0.14%
(1.38)
0.56%***
(6.04)

-0.05%*
(-1.97)
0.51%***
(14.26)

-0.01%
(-0.79)
0.14%***
(8.37)

-0.45%**
(-2.25)
-0.37%
(-1.25)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.3. Post-split changes in short interest: multivariate framework
The table contains coefficients from a set of panel regressions of short interest in a [t-10, t+10]
window around split announcements. We estimate the following model:
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the number of firm i’s shares in short positions in month t scaled by the number of
shares outstanding. SPLITTERi is the indicator variable equal to 1 for splitters and 0 for matched nonsplitters. POSTt is the indicator variable equal to 0 in the pre-event months and equal to 1 in the event
and post-event months. The 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 vector of control variables includes (i) ARi,t, is the abnormal return
estimated with the Fama and French three-factor model; (ii) VOLATi,t is volatility estimated as the
average daily (high price – low price)/low price; (iii) ILLIQi,t is illiquidity estimated as the average
daily bid-ask spread as in Corwin and Schultz (2012), with negative spreads set to zero; and (iv)
INSTi,t is institutional ownership, computed as the number of shares in institutional holdings reported
via 13-F forms and scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Specification [3] and [4] include
idiosyncratic volatility IVOLATi,t, estimated as in Brandt, Brav, Graham and Kumar (2009). Panel A
reports the pooled regressions results, where we have one observation for every month t for every
splitter and matched non-splitter in the [t-10, t+10] window. Panel B reports the averaged regression
results, containing only two observations in the [t-10, t+10] window for each splitter and each
matched non-splitter: one averaged over the pre-announcement months and the other averaged over
the post-announcement months. The models are adjusted for firm and year fixed effects, and
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West estimator. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Pooled
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
POST
0.402***
0.244***
0.246***
0.244***
(18.15)
(11.39)
(11.49)
(11.39)
SPLITTER×POST

-0.207***
(-7.93)

-0.217***
(-8.61)

-0.203***
(-8.07)

-0.217***
(-8.61)

AR

-0.003***
(-7.25)

-0.003***
(-8.43)

-0.003***
(-7.19)

VOLAT

0.057***
(12.11)

ILLIQ

-0.031***
(-2.77)

INST

0.076***
(74.10)

IVOLAT
# obs.
R2

0.056***
(9.29)
0.006
(0.58)
0.076***
(74.28)
0.003***
(8.75)

165,732
0.027

165,732
0.092

165,732
0.091

-0.031***
(-2.76)
0.076***
(74.07)
0.000
(0.17)
165,732
0.092
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Panel B: Averaged
POST
SPLITTER×POST

0.558***
(14.57)
-0.193***
(-3.60)

AR

0.061
(1.47)

0.061
(1.48)

0.060
(1.46)

-0.195***
(-3.71)

-0.172***
(-3.31)

-0.196***
(-3.71)

-0.049***
(-10.42)

-0.052***
(-11.12)

-0.049***
(-10.34)

VOLAT

0.120***
(4.01)

ILLIQ

-0.202***
(-2.65)

-0.114*
(-1.65)

-0.201***
(-2.64)

INST

0.092***
(29.45)

0.093***
(29.73)

0.092***
(29.34)

IVOLAT
# obs.
R2

16,840
0.040

16,414
0.157

0.117***
(2.81)

0.787***
(2.89)

0.041
(0.11)

16,414
0.156

16,380
0.157

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.4. Testing the signaling hypothesis
The table contains coefficient estimates from a set of panel regressions of short interest between the preannouncement and post-announcement periods. We estimate the following model:
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝒙𝒊,𝒕 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the number of firm i’s shares in short positions in month t scaled by the number of shares
outstanding, where t ∈ [-10, +10]. SPLITTERi is the indicator variable equal to 1 for splitters and 0 for
matched non-splitters. POSTt is the indicator variable equal to 0 in the pre-event months and equal to 1
in the event and post-event months. 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 is the indicator variable corresponding to a split characteristic or
a splitting firm characteristic and has the same value for splitting firms and their matches. We consider
the following characteristics: (i) split size (similarly to Byun and Rozeff (2003), 2:1 and larger splits are
considered large); (ii) firm’s splitting experience (similarly to Conroy and Harris (1999), firms that have
split prior to the current split are considered seasoned splitters); (iii) splitting to a lower price that that
achieved through a previous split; (iv) dispersion of analyst opinion (similarly to Hou, Peng and Xiong
(2009), dispersion is measured as the standard deviation of the earnings forecast of the current fiscal year,
scaled by the absolute value of the mean forecast, averaged over the previous year; firms in the 3 highest
dispersion deciles are considered to have a high dispersion); (v and vi) R&D expenses and the ratio of
intangible assets to total assets (firms in the 3 highest R&D and relative intangibles deciles are considered
to have high R&D or intangibles). The 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 vector of control variables (estimated but not tabulated)
includes: (i) ARi,t, is the monthly abnormal return estimated with the Fama and French 3 factor model; (ii)
VOLATi,t is the monthly volatility estimated as the average daily (high price – low price)/low price; (iii)
ILLIQi,t is the monthly illiquidity estimated as the average daily bid-ask spread as in Corwin and Schultz
(2012), with negative spreads set to zero; (iv) INSTi,t is the institutional ownership computed as the
number of shares in institutional holdings reported via 13-F forms and scaled by the number of shares
outstanding. The models are adjusted for firm and year fixed effects, and autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West estimator. t-statistics are in parentheses.
seasoned
seasoned to
high
high
high
large split
splitter
lower price dispersion
R&D
intangibles
POST

0.183***
(6.37)

0.228***
(7.41)

0.234***
(9.95)

0.256***
(11.44)

0.236***
(10.87)

0.224***
(9.90)

POST×δ

0.112***
(3.20)

0.034
(0.93)

0.053
(1.35)

-0.099*
(-1.75)

0.129**
(2.17)

0.127***
(2.84)

POST×
SPLITTER

-0.063*
(-1.70)

-0.050
(-1.23)

-0.184*** -0.190***
(-6.38)
(-7.11)

-0.165***
(-6.36)

-0.127***
(-4.63)

POST×
SPLITTER×δ

-0.264***
(-5.32)

-0.261***
(-5.11)

-0.109**
(-1.96)

-0.235***
(-2.98)

-0.505***
(-6.00)

-0.449***
(-7.17)

Yes
0.093

Yes
0.092

Yes
0.092

CONTROLS
R2

Yes
0.092

Yes
0.093

Yes
0.092

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

34

Table 1.5 Sub-period analysis
Panel A contains the coefficients from a set of panel regressions of short interest of splitters and their
matches in a [t-10, t+10] window around split announcements. We estimate the following model:
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the number of firm i’s shares in short positions in month t scaled by the number of shares
outstanding. SPLITTERi is the indicator variable equal to 1 for splitters and 0 for matched non-splitters.
POSTt is the indicator variable equal to 0 in the pre-event months and equal to 1 in the event and postevent months. The 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 vector of control variables ARi,t, VOLATi,t, ILLIQi,t, and INSTi,t are defined as in
Table 1.4. Panel B reports the 𝛽4 coefficients in the model:
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 +
𝒙𝒊,𝒕 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
where 𝛿𝑖,𝑡 is the indicator variable corresponding to a split characteristic or a splitting firm characteristic
and has the same value for splitting firms and their matches. The characteristics are defined as in Table 1.4
and the 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 vector of control variables includes ARi,t, VOLATi,t, ILLIQi,t, and INSTi,t. The models are
adjusted for firm and year fixed effects, and autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the Newey-West
estimator. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: Pooled
1988-2000
POST
0.229***
(9.13)
SPLITTER×POST
-0.160***
(-5.41)
AR
-0.002***
(-4.74)
VOLAT
0.051***
(9.74)
ILLIQ
-0.073***
(-6.16)
INST
0.053***
(45.60)
# obs.
101,724
2
R
0.065
Panel B: Split or splitting firm characteristics
large split
-0.204***
(-3.62)
seasoned splitter
-0.312***
(-5.44)
seasoned to lower price
-0.305***
(-4.84)
high dispersion
0.198**
(1.98)
high R&D
-0.566***
(-5.41)
high intangibles
-0.459***
(-5.67)

2001-2007
0.177***
(3.86)
-0.151***
(-2.79)
-0.002**
(-2.54)
0.105***
(8.20)
-0.005
(-0.15)
0.163***
(64.25)
44,184
0.202
-0.314***
(-2.98)
-0.158
(-1.41)
0.260**
(2.17)
-0.163
(-1.15)
-0.095
(-0.58)
-0.489***
(-4.21)

2008-2018
0.259*
(1.95)
-0.671***
(-4.35)
0.002
(0.92)
0.044*
(1.72)
-0.028
(-0.31)
0.133***
(17.76)
5,796
0.117
-0.465
(-1.45)
-0.612*
(-1.84)
0.020
(0.06)
-0.808***
(-2.58)
-0.632*
(-1.80)
0.869***
(2.89)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.6. Addressing confounding events
The table contains the coefficients from a set of panel regressions of short interest of splitters and their
matches in a [t-10, t+10] window around split announcements. We estimate the following model:
𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 +
𝛽4 𝑆𝑃𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑖 × 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑡 × 𝐿𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 𝜸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the number of firm i’s shares in short positions in month t scaled by the number of shares
outstanding. SPLITTERi is the indicator variable equal to 1 for splitters and 0 for matched non-splitters.
POSTt is the indicator variable equal to 0 in the pre-event months and equal to 1 in the event and postevent months. 𝐿𝑆𝑖 is the indicator variable equal to 1 for 2:1 and larger splits and is equal to 0 otherwise.
The 𝒙𝒊,𝒕 vector of control variables includes (i) ARi,t, is the monthly abnormal return estimated with the
Fama and French 3 factor model; (ii) VOLATi,t is the monthly volatility estimated as the average daily
(high price – low price)/low price; (iii) ILLIQi,t is the monthly illiquidity estimated as the average daily
bid-ask spread as in Corwin and Schultz (2012), with negative spreads set to zero; (iv) INSTi,t is the
institutional ownership computed as the number of shares in institutional holdings reported via 13-F
forms and scaled by the number of shares outstanding. In this table, we control for the following
confounding effects: (i) inclusions and exclusions from the S&P 500 index, and (ii) dividend changes.
Panel A contains the number of splits that are accompanied by events of each kind and the total number
of confounding events. Panel B contains the results for the sample without confounding effects. The
models are tested and adjusted for firm and year fixed effects and heteroskedasticity using Newey-West
estimator. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: The number of confounding events
S&P500
inclusions & exclusions
dividend changes
total confounding events
96 & 1

2,092

2,155

Panel B: Elimination of confounding events
[1]
POST

0.213***
(5.87)

POST×LS
POST×SPLITTER

-0.157***
(-3.67)

POST×SPLITTER×LS
CONTROLS
# obs.
R2

Yes
75,222
0.098

[2]
0.112**
(2.28)
0.188***
(3.10)
0.053
(0.83)
-0.386***
(-4.51)
Yes
75,222
0.098

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.7. Calendar-time abnormal returns (CTARs)
The table contains calendar-time abnormal returns computed similarly to Nain and Yao (2013). We
report the CTARS as the alphas estimated from a four-factor model over the sample period 19882018:
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 (𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝑠𝑖 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑖 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑚𝑖 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
where 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is the monthly return on the portfolio that includes all firms that have split within the prior
12, 24, or 36 months (corresponding to panels A, B, and C, respectively), including dividends, in
month t, 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 is the one-month Treasury bill return, and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the return on the CRSP value- or equalweighted portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. The size and book-to-market factors
are defined as in Fama and French (1993), and the momentum factor is defined as in Carhart (1997).
As Byun and Rozeff (2003), we estimate CTARs separately for large splits (2:1 and larger) and small
splits. Additionally, within split size groups, we estimate CTARs for all splitters in the sample and
then separately (i) for splits followed by the largest declines in short interest in the 5 months following
the split, ∆ijSIlarge, and (ii) for splits followed by the smallest changes in short interest in the 5 months
following the split, ∆ijSIsmall. Largest declines in short interest are defined as those below the 30th
percentile of all changes. Smallest changes are defined as those above the 70th percentile.
Panel A: 12-month CTAR
large split
small split
all
∆ijSIlarge
∆ijSIsmall
all
∆ijSIlarge
∆ijSIsmall
EW

0.69**
(2.11)

1.48***
(3.85)

-0.22
(-0.48)

0.45
(1.40)

0.94**
(2.47)

-0.18
(-0.48)

VW

0.97***
(2.87)

1.81***
(4.55)

0.06
(0.13)

0.77**
(2.29)

1.29***
(3.25)

0.23
(0.57)

Panel B: 24-month CTAR
all

large split
∆ijSIlarge

∆ijSIsmall

all

small split
∆ijSIlarge

∆ijSIsmall

EW

0.59**
(2.01)

1.36***
(4.28)

0.02
(0.05)

0.33
(1.10)

0.96***
(2.73)

-0.01
(-0.04)

VW

0.84***
(2.79)

1.68***
(5.06)

0.31
(0.82)

0.61**
(1.99)

1.28***
(3.51)

0.31
(0.86)

all

small split
∆ijSIlarge

∆ijSIsmall

Panel C: 36-month CTAR
all

large split
∆ijSIlarge

∆ijSIsmall

EW

0.53**
(1.99)

1.21***
(3.91)

0.02
(0.06)

0.35
(1.22)

0.81**
(2.36)

-0.22
(-0.67)

VW

0.78***
(2.81)

1.53***
(4.73)

0.30
(0.85)

0.61**
(2.06)

1.10***
(3.11)

0.09
(0.27)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1.1 Abnormal short interest around split announcements
We estimate the propensity to split as the predicted value from the following panel logistic regression:
Pr (spliti,t = 1) = α + β1 SIi,t-1 + β2 ∆SIi,[t- 10; t-1] + β3 PRATIOi,t-1 + β4 ARi,[t-10; t-1] +
β5 ∆VOLATi,[t-10; t-1] + β6 ∆ILLIQi,[t-10; t-1] + β7 ∆INST,[t-10; t-1] + β8 NYSEDi,t-1 +
β9 SIXTNTHSt + β10 DECIMALSt + β11 POSTCRISISt + εi,t,
where the binary dependent variable spliti,t equals 1 if firm i announces a split in month t and equals 0
otherwise; SIi,t-1 is the short interest in shares divided by the total number of shares outstanding;
∆SIi,[t- 10; t-1] is the average rate of monthly change in short interest during the 10-month pre-split
announcement period (all changes are computed as month-to-month continuous growth rates that are then
averaged across the 10 pre-split months); PRATIOi,t-1 is firm i’s price in the pre-split announcement month
divided by the average price for all sample stocks excluding firm i as in Lakonishok and Lev (1987); ARi,[t10; t-1] is the mean monthly pre-split BHAR estimated as in Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) with the Fama
and French 3 factor model as benchmark return; ∆VOLATi,[t-10; t-1] is the change in stock i’s volatility, where
the monthly volatility is estimated as the average daily (high price – low price)/low price. ∆ILLIQi,[t-10;t-1] is
the change in stock i’s illiquidity computed as the average daily bid-ask spread as in Corwin and Schultz
(2012); ∆INSTi,[t-10; t-1] is the change in stock i’s institutional ownership computed as the number of shares
in institutional holdings reported via Form 13-F, scaled by the number of shares outstanding; NYSEDi,t-1 is
the NYSE market capitalization decile of firm i; SIXTNTHSt and DECIMALSt are indicator variables that
identify minimum tick size regimes. POSTCRISISt is an indicator variable that equals 1 from the year 2008
̂ (𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 = 1)𝑖,𝑡 , we match (without
onwards. Having obtained predicted values for the propensity to split, 𝑃𝑟
replacement) every firm i that announces a split in month t with a non-splitting firm j whose propensity to
split in month t-1 is the closest to that of firm i’s. To be eligible for matching, firm j cannot have split in
the 10 months preceding or the 10 months following the split by firm i. Upon matching, we compute (for
splitters and matched non-splitters, in each event-window month) the abnormal short interest metric as
𝐴𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 10−1 ∑−20
−11 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 , where SIi,t is the number of i’s shares in short positions in month t scaled
by the number of shares outstanding. Finally, for each splitter/non-splitter pair, we compute the relative
short interest, ∆𝑖𝑗 𝑆𝐼𝑡 , as the difference between abnormal short interest statistics for every month in the
event window. The mean differences are plotted in the figure. Time 0 represents the first post-split
announcement collection of short interest.
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Table 1.A1. Split decision determinants and propensity score estimation
The table examines split determinants and reports the model used for estimation of the propensity to
split. For the analysis of split determinants, we estimate the following logistic regression:
Pr (spliti,t = 1) = α + β1 SIi,t-1 + β2 ∆SIi,[t- κ; t-1] + β3 PRATIOi,t-1 + β4 ARi,[t-10; t-1] +
β5 ∆VOLATi,[t-10; t-1] + β6 ∆ILLIQi,[t-10; t-1] + β7 ∆INST,[t-10; t-1] + β8 NYSEDi,t-1 +
β9 SIXTNTHSt + β10 DECIMALSt + β11 POSTCRISISt + εi,t,
where the binary dependent variable spliti,t equals 1 if firm i announces a split in month t and equals
0 otherwise; SIi,t-1 is the short interest; ∆SIi,[t- κ; t-1], with {κ = 10 or κ = 5} is the average rate of monthly
change in short interest during the 10-month (or 5-month) pre-split announcement period; PRATIOi,t1 is firm i’s price in the pre-split announcement month divided by the average price for all sample
stocks excluding firm i; ARi,[t-10; t-1] is the mean monthly pre-split BHAR; ∆VOLATi,[t-10; t-1] is the
monthly pre-split change in stock i’s volatility, where the monthly volatility is estimated as the
average daily (high price – low price)/low price. ∆ILLIQi,[t-10;t-1] is the mean monthly pre-split change
in stock i’s illiquidity computed as the average daily bid-ask spread as in Corwin and Schultz (2012),
with negative spreads set equal to zero; ∆INSTi,[t-10; t-1], the mean monthly pre-split change in
institutional ownership of stock i. Institutional ownership is computed as the number of shares in
institutional holdings reported via Form 13-F, scaled by the number of shares outstanding; NYSEDi,t1 is the NYSE market capitalization decile of firm i; SIXTNTHSt and DECIMALSt are indicator
variables that identify minimum tick size regimes. POSTCRISISt is an indicator variable equal to 1
from the year 2008 onward. Reported coefficients represent marginal effects, and t-statistics are in
parentheses.
[1]
[2]
[3]
SI
0.009
0.034
(0.09)
(0.37)
0.007
∆SI[t-5; t-1]
(0.69)
∆SI[t-10; t-1]
-0.022
(-1.15)
PRATIO
0.153***
0.153***
0.153***
(45.40)
(43.77)
(43.74)
ARi,[t-10; t-1]
2.557***
2.425***
2.440***
(27.32)
(25.41)
(25.34)
∆VOLATi,[t-10;t-1]
0.217
0.284*
0.312**
(1.44)
(1.79)
(1.96)
∆ILLIQi,[t-10;t-1]
-0.430***
-0.456***
-0.467***
(-8.19)
(-8.35)
(-8.54)
∆INSTi,[t-10;t-1]
2.064***
2.058***
2.059***
(24.20)
(23.47)
(23.20)
NYSED
-0.021***
-0.021***
-0.021***
(-13.58)
(-13.58)
(-13.70)
SIXTNTHS
-0.062***
-0.063***
-0.064***
(-6.94)
(-7.10)
(-7.18)
DECIMALS
-0.068***
-0.066***
-0.067***
(-8.08)
(-7.52)
(-7.54)
POSTCRISIS
-0.354***
-0.352***
-0.356***
(-26.10)
(-26.48)
(-26.59)
# obs.
1,158,330
1,094,155
1,093,343
pseudo-R2
0.135
0.139
0.139
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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2. INSIDER AND RETAIL TRADING
2.1 Introduction
Retail investors are traditionally seen as noise traders, with no shortage of studies
documenting systematic biases in their trading behavior (e.g., Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean,
2001; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010). More recently however, studies utilizing comprehensive datasets
show that retail stock purchases (sales) are followed by abnormal positive (negative) returns,
suggesting that retail investors are informed (e.g., Kaniel, Liu, Saar, and Titman, 2012; Kelley and
Tetlock, 2013; Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang, 2021). In the meantime, a large body of
literature shows that despite legal and corporate restrictions, insider traders are informed at both
short and long horizons (e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Ben-David, Birru, and Rossi,
2019). What has not gathered a lot of attention, however, is how the trading patterns of these
groups are related to each other. Such patterns are useful to study for at least two reasons.
First, since corporate insiders are in fact retail traders, Kaniel et al. (2012) raise the question
of whether return predictability associated with retail trades can be attributed to insider trades. If
this is true, as Chung (2020) argues, much of the literature on retail investors needs to be
reinterpreted in the light of the literature on insiders. Using recent and comprehensive U.S. data.,
this paper shows that this is not the case. When retail traders purchase more shares than they sell,
future returns are positive irrespective of whether corporate insiders traded simultaneously.
Relatedly, there is evidence consistent with retail investors learning from publicly disclosed insider
trades (Sias and Whidbee, 2010; Stotz, 2012; Boehmer, Sang, and Zhang, 2021), raising the
question of how much of the return predictability remains after stripping out these trades. The data
show that retail purchases similarly predict future returns during weeks when no recent insider
trade has occurred.
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A second reason to study the joint trading patterns of insider and retail traders is to better
understand their sources of information. Do they trade on distinct and unrelated information, or is
there some overlap? In addition to retail traders mimicking insiders, do insiders strategically trade
on retail trading activity?
One possibility is that insiders trade in the opposite direction of retail investors to exploit
temporary price pressures induced by intense retail trading (Mansi, Peng, Qi, and Shi, 2021). It is
well established that insider trades tend to be contrarian (e.g., Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Piotroski
and Roulstone, 2005) however even after controlling for past returns insiders may earn abnormal
returns by trading contrary to retail traders specifically. This is because the reversal of retailinduced price movements is stronger than that of simple price changes (Barber and Odean, 2008;
Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2011). Insiders may further buy their stock not just for personal profits
but also to signal to the market that the stock is undervalued (Babenko, Tserlukevich, and
Vedrashko, 2012). This arguably makes more sense after retail traders are selling the stock, to
convince them to stop selling or start (re)purchasing the stock.
This paper sheds new light on the relative importance of these channels by analyzing the
returns following instances where insiders and retail traders either trade in the same or the opposite
direction. When the dominant channel is insider signaling, positive returns would be expected
when insiders buy following retail sales. When insiders exploit retail-induced temporary price
pressures, returns should be large when the groups trade in opposite directions, especially after
retail purchases (Mansi et al., 2021). On the other hand, when insiders share information sets with
retail traders, returns should be large when insiders and retail investors trade in the same direction.
In this case, we might expect stronger results for informed trades. It is well known that insider
sales contain considerably less price-relevant information relative to insider purchases, making it
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harder to separate noise from information. In addition, retail sales appear to contain less
information relative to retail purchases (Kaniel, Saar, and Titman, 2008; Boehmer, Jones, Zhang,
and Zhang, 2021), suggesting that the interactions should be stronger for purchases relative to sales.
Consistent with the overlapping information sets channel, the data show that future returns are
abnormally large after both insiders and retail investors purchase a security. No interaction is
observed for sales, consistent with sales being less information-driven. It is also possible that
insider exploitation of retail-induced upward price pressures negates the effects of overlapping
information.
Perhaps the most obvious mechanism which would cause overlapping information between
the two groups is retail investors mimicking insider trades, as suggested by Boehmer, Sang, and
Zhang (2021). Alternatively, they may share private information, or they might be superior at
processing public information. The critical feature of these channels that allows tests of their
relative importance is that insider mimicking requires that retail investors must know about
upcoming or executed insider trades, whereas this is largely irrelevant if they share other
information.
Therefore, I test whether there is still an information overlap in settings where retail
investors are unlikely to learn from insider trades. The first setting focuses on periods where insider
trades were executed but not yet disclosed by the SEC. This may not be sufficient because some
retail traders could discover insider trades before they are officially disclosed by the SEC, perhaps
through word of mouth. I therefore also study retail trades occurring not only prior to SEC
disclosure but also prior to the execution of insider trades. In these settings the data continue to
suggest that there is some overlap in information between insiders and retail investors, suggesting
that it is not primarily retail investors mimicking insiders that drive these results.
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The expected positive interaction between insider and retail trades on returns for the
overlapping information sets channel hinges on the notion that the two groups will only be more
likely to trade in the same direction if an insider trade is informed. When an insider trade is not
informed there could not be any information overlap, so there is no reason to believe that retail
traders would be trading in the same direction. As a robustness check, therefore, I confirm that the
interaction disappears for routine insider trades as classified by Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorksi
(2012) and Ali and Hirshleifer (2017). The interaction between retail purchases and opportunistic
purchases as classified by either algorithm is similarly strong to the overall universe of insider
purchases. All interactions for insider sales remain insignificant, including interactions with
opportunistic insider sales.
To gain a deeper understanding of the interaction between retail and insider purchases on
future returns, it is worthwhile to examine the relationship at various horizons. Do the effects relate
to short-term or long-term information? Do insiders who buy stocks contemporaneously with retail
investors earn higher profits? If it is only a short-term phenomenon, this may not be the case given
that they need to hand over any profits made on trades closed within 6 months (Cziraki and Gider,
2021). Market-adjusted returns keep increasing in magnitude up to at least a year after insider
purchases accompanied by retail purchases, ending the year around 2.7%. In contrast, returns after
insider purchases accompanied by retail sales appear to stabilize around 1% after 4 months. This
analysis suggests that the positive overlapping information when both parties buy is of a longerterm nature, though it does not control for known stock return predictors.
Finally, portfolio return analyses corroborate the main results. A portfolio that mimics
insider trades in the past week where retail traders agree (i.e., long (short) stocks bought by insiders
on days with retail buying (selling)) generates at least 0.43% weekly excess returns, while the
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corresponding pure insider mimicking portfolio earns 0.33% and a similar pure retail mimicking
portfolio generates 0.07% per week. The fourth portfolio that is examined mimics insider trades
where retail investors disagree (i.e., long (short) stocks bought by insiders in the past week on days
with retail selling (buying)), which earns at least 0.22% per week. All results are stronger on an
equal-weighted basis relative to value-weighted, consistent with small stocks being less efficient
and thus allowing for greater profits from informed trading.
To provide a more robust answer to the question of whether the retail-insider interaction
relates to short- or long-term information, holding periods are extended from one week to 4, 12,
and 52 weeks. Consistent with most of the information contained in insider (and retail) trades being
impounded in prices within a few weeks, alphas for all portfolios decline as the horizon is extended
(with alphas continuing to be measured on a weekly basis). No alpha is observed for the retail
mimicking portfolio on a 12-week basis, and value-weighted alphas become insignificant for the
portfolio that mimics insiders where retail traders disagree. With a 52-week holding period, only
the portfolio that mimics insiders where retail traders agree retains significant alpha, albeit only
on an equal-weighted basis. These results support the notion that the information overlap between
insiders and retail investors is of at least a medium-term nature.
Overall, this paper contributes to the literature on retail trading and insider trading by
showing that the return predictability associated with retail trades cannot be attributed to insiders
being a subset of retail traders, nor retail traders mimicking insiders. It is still possible that it is
driven by insiders trading stocks other than their own, which is plausible as they earn abnormal
returns trading in same-industry stocks (Ben-David et al., 2019). These effects are not controlled
for in this study due to a lack of data. I further document an interaction between insider and retail
purchases that predicts particularly large positive returns. These results are most consistent with
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retail traders and insiders sharing positive price-relevant information that is of at least a mediumterm nature. It could very well be that there are other interactions between insiders and retail traders,
such as insiders exploiting temporary retail-induced price pressures or retail traders selectively
mimicking high-value insider trades. However, these other channels cannot by themselves explain
why returns are especially large after insiders and retail investors purchase around the same time.
The next section contains a literature review and discusses alternative explanations for the
main findings. The data are discussed in section 2.3, and the methods and main empirical results
in section 2.4. The final section concludes.

2.2 Literature Review
This paper is not the first to study interactions between retail investors and insiders. Sias and
Whidbee (2010) use U.S. data from a brokerage firm from 1991 to 1996 to show that retail
investors are net buyers (sellers) in the 60 (20) trading days surrounding insider purchases (sales).
Of particular interest is their finding that individual investors appear to start trading in the same
direction as upcoming insider trades up to 10 days in advance, consistent with these groups sharing
information beyond retail investors mimicking insiders. My study utilizes more recent and
comprehensive data and applies more specific tests to answer this question.
Stotz (2012) uses German data from a stockbroker from 2008 and 2009 to show that retail
traders copy insider trades up to 20 trading days after insider trades are publicly disclosed.
Boehmer, Sang, and Zhang (2021) study retail mimicking of insider trades where retail trades are
inferred using the algorithm of Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021) applied to U.S. TAQ
data from 2010 through 2018. These papers are complementary to mine in that they focus on the
patterns of retail trading following insider trading whereas I examine how interactions among these
groups may explain the overall return predictability associated with retail trades, and what drives
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the overall positive interaction effect between insider and retail purchases. Boehmer, Sang, and
Zhang (2021) also find such a positive interaction and state that it “suggests that retail investors
learn from the opportunistic insider purchases”. While this may be true, I find that the interaction
is still there under circumstances where retail investors did not learn from insider trades, suggesting
that these groups also share information through other means.
Chung (2020) also studies the interaction between retail and insider trades directly and
argues that retail trading contains no incremental information about future stock returns for stocks
with insider trading. His retail trading data originate from the NYSE which captures a much
smaller share of overall retail trading, may be less representative of the typical retail trader, and
may contain relatively more insiders than the sample studied in this paper. I identify retail trades
using TAQ data and apply the algorithm of Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021), which is
explained and contrasted to NYSE data in section 3. The more insider trades are contained in the
retail data, the less likely it is to find incremental information in retail trades relative to insider
trades. This could help explain why Chung (2020) does not find a statistically significant positive
interaction.
Mansi et al. (2021) show that there are more opportunistic insider sales (purchases) when
Google's Search Volume Index (SVI), a proxy for retail investor attention, is high (low). Building
on the finding that a high SVI is positively related to transient increases in stock prices (Da,
Engelberg, and Gao, 2011), they argue that insiders take advantage of temporary price pressures
induced by retail investor attention. This line of reasoning seems plausible, especially given that
Kelley and Tetlock (2017) find that retail shorts are particularly informed when other retail
investors are buying. Given that shorting is expensive for individual traders and requires a certain
sophistication, such trades may be particularly informed. Since corporate insiders are uniquely
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informed, it might not be surprising to find a similar exploitation of retail trading by insiders.
However, this is not necessarily the case, since insider trades are monitored, restricted, and
scrutinized, whereas retail short sellers typically remain anonymous and experience relatively few
trading restrictions.
Mansi et al. (2021) do not, however, relate insider trading directly to retail trading activity,
relying instead on indirect evidence. My data facilitate studying the direct link between insider and
retail trades and it is not found that insider sales are more profitable during periods of net retail
buying. However, if this channel is stronger for insider sales than for insider purchases, as in Mansi
et al. (2021), this may help explain why the data does not reveal a negative interaction between
retail sales and insider sales.

2.3 Data and sample
Retail trades are identified using TAQ data from 2010-2015 and applying the algorithm of
Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021). This algorithm builds on the fact that many retail
orders are executed internally by brokers or by wholesalers (market makers that combine order
flow from multiple sources) who offer better prices than publicly posted bids and asks. For
example, if the current best ask is $10.00 and a retail investor places a market order to buy, a broker
can route this order to a wholesaler that executes the order at $9.999. These price improvements
are usually smaller than $0.005, allowing retail purchases to be distinguished from sales based on
the execution price. Most price-improved retail transactions take place off-exchange but are
reported to a FINRA Trade Reporting Facility (TRF). Therefore, the algorithm works by
classifying transactions reported to a FINRA TRF with prices ending in the interval (0,0.4) cents
as retail sales and those in the interval (0.6,1) as retail purchases.
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Following Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021), the sample period is restricted to
2010-2015 even though data on sub-penny price improvements are available from 2005. This is
because up until 2010 there is an upward trend of the number of sub-penny trades, likely because
the practice of offering price improvement for retail trades in sub pennies was increasingly adopted.
The tick size pilot program came into effect in 2016, limiting price improvements for many stocks.
Not all market orders by retail traders are captured in the data. While many retail trades are
executed by wholesalers who pay for retail order flow and offer better prices, resulting in subpenny execution prices, some retail trades are executed on the exchanges directly (Battalio,
Corwin, and Jennings, 2016). Moreover, if any retail trades are executed at prices that end in the
[0.4, 0.6] interval, they cannot be distinguished from institutional trades which can also be
executed at midpoint dark pools. Nevertheless, the total retail dollar volume constitutes 6.85% of
total volume in the sample, a notably larger percentage than studies using other U.S. datasets. To
the best of my knowledge, the most comprehensive U.S. retail dataset other than this is used by
Kelley and Tetlock (2013), whose retail data comprise 2.3% of total dollar volume traded.
Besides capturing a relatively large chunk of retail trades, this dataset is also attractive
relative to the NYSE data studied by Chung (2020) because it seems likely that insider trades
constitute a smaller portion of retail trades. First, insider traders tend to be informed and so brokers
and wholesalers are incentivized to avoid taking the other side. As retail investors need to report
to brokers if they are insiders, brokers know which clients are insiders and could opt not to offer
price improvement to these trades. Second, insider trades are often large and wholesalers have the
right to reject large orders6. In lieu of being offered price improvement, insider orders may be more
likely to be placed directly on the NYSE and flagged as retail trades. Third, many firms adopt

6

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/316709/000031670904000037/exh10_262.txt, section II (a) (i).
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special insider trading policies which may include restrictions on which broker to use7 (which may
execute trades differently from typical retail brokers). Fourth, the daily dollar volume of at least
half of the insider trades is greater than the combined retail trading volume on the same stock,
indicating that most insider trades are at least not fully identified as retail trades.
The sample is constructed by narrowing over 2 million individual insider trades down to
about 625 thousand based on various standard filters described in Table 2.1. The sample is further
reduced by aggregating multiple insider trades on the same stock and day to one observation,
leaving just over 250 thousand observations. Stock returns and characteristics from CRSP, bookto-market values from Compustat, and quarterly earnings announcements are added from both
Compustat and I/B/E/S.
The earnings announcements are used to identify opportunistic trades according to the
algorithm of Ali and Hirshleifer (2017) described below. Observations with timestamps at or after
4 p.m. are assumed to correspond to after-market hours because almost all earnings during the
sample period are announced outside trading hours (Gregoire and Martineau, 2021). Only I/B/E/S
data contain timestamps, resulting in 18% of the merged announcements not having timestamps.
To avoid a potential forward-looking bias, these announcements are assumed to have taken place
before market hours. For the same reason, the earlier date of the two sources is used if the earnings
dates from Compustat and I/B/E/S conflict (less than 1% of the data).
Opportunistic and routine trades are identified using the algorithms of Cohen et al. (2012)
and Ali and Hirshleifer (2017). Cohen et al. (2012) classify opportunistic trades as those made by
insiders that have made at least 1 trade in three consecutive prior years but are not categorized as
routine. Routine trades are defined as those executed by insiders that have traded in the same

7

https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/24/a-guide-to-rule-10b5-1-plans/
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calendar month for three consecutive years before the evaluated trades. Insiders that have not
traded in at least 3 consecutive prior years are not categorized.
Ali and Hirshleifer (2017) use the profitability of prior insider trades in the 21 trading days
prior to quarterly earnings announcements (QEAs) to distinguish between opportunistic and
routine trades. Despite many firms having blackout periods prior to QEAs, these trades comprise
about 15% of total insider trades in my sample. Pre-QEA insider trades happen because many
firms allow exceptions upon request, not all firms implement blackout periods, and sometimes
trading restrictions are violated (Ali and Hirshleifer, 2017). Profitability is captured by the 5-day
stock return centered around QEAs. At the start of each calendar year, the insiders in the most
profitable quintile are deemed opportunistic, and those in the lower three quintiles are deemed
routine traders. Insiders that have not traded in pre-QEA periods and those in the fourth quintile
are not categorized.
Sample characteristics are summarized in Table 2.2. To minimize the impact of outliers,
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% where appropriate. Not surprisingly, there are no insider
trades during most days in the sample, and on insider trading days there is typically just one insider
trade. The average number of retail trades is 233 per day per stock, whereas the daily dollar
volumes of insiders and retail investors are more comparable at about 1 and 3 million dollars,
respectively. Consistent with previous literature, insider sales are more prevalent and substantially
larger than purchases. Retail trading volume captures 6.85% (= (1.47+1.47)/42.91) of total dollar
trading volume on average, and 3.81% (= (118.24 + 115.17)/6123) of total trades. The larger share
of volume is consistent with Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021) in that the rise of
algorithmic trading caused the average retail trade to become larger than other trades.
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All types of trading volumes have much larger averages than medians, are highly skewed
and leptokurtic. Therefore, for the main analysis, I simplify retail trading activity by defining a
dummy variable RetailBuy which is equal to one if retail purchases are greater in dollar volume
than retail sales and zero otherwise. Similarly, InsiderBuy and InsiderSell are dummy variables
equal to one if insiders are net buying or selling. A richer measure of the directionality of retail
trading is retail order imbalance (ROIB) computed as (retail buy volume – retail sell volume)/(retail
buy volume + retail sell volume) where volumes are in number of shares traded. An equivalent
insider order imbalance is not evaluated because there are relatively few days where insiders are
both buying and selling. Collapsing insider trading activity into one variable also has the
disadvantage of forcing insider purchases to have the exact opposite effect as insider sales. Using
indicator variables to capture both retail and insider trading activity further has the advantage of
easier interpretation relative to using order imbalances as the retail and insider order imbalance
distributions are very different.
To further understand the data better, correlations between these dummy variables and
various firm characteristics are shown in Table 2.3. If insiders and retail investors share
information, they are probably more likely to trade in the same direction, especially for purchases
as insider purchases tend to be informed whereas insider sales may not be. Indeed, the correlation
between retail and insider purchases is significantly positive. However, it is small (0.01) in part
because on most days there are no insider days – when evaluated only over the days where there
are insider trades, the correlation becomes 0.05. A smaller and only weakly significant negative
correlation is found between insider sales and retail purchases. The correlation between the insider
trading dummy variables is -0.02 (instead of -1) because on most days there are no insider trades
and both variables equal zero. Most correlations between firm characteristics and trading activity
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variables are significant and slightly larger in absolute value, motivating the inclusion of these
variables into later regression analyses.
Comparing insider purchases and sales to retail trading activity, Table 2.4 further shows that
retail investors and insiders tend to trade in the same direction: 54.6% of all insider trades are in
the same direction as the average retail trade on the same day. When both insiders and retail traders
buy, stock returns in the following week are about 0.28% (= 1.17% - 0.91%) higher compared to
when insiders buy and retail traders sell. Analogous returns in the following year are substantially
larger at 2.33% (2.91% - 0.58%). For sales, there does not appear to be an analogous relation, and
average returns are close to zero.
The table also contains statistics on opportunistic and routine insider trades. Providing outof-sample evidence of the findings of Cohen et al. (2012) and Ali and Hirshleifer (2017), returns
are higher (lower) for opportunistic insider purchases (sales) with either classification algorithm.
The Cohen et al. (2012) algorithm appears to be slightly better able to capture outperforming
purchases whereas Ali and Hirshleifer's (2017) classification is relatively good at capturing
outperforming opportunistic sales. Panel B reports next-week returns by retail order imbalance
quintiles. There is a largely monotonic relationship across the quintiles, where the outperformance
associated with retail trades is concentrated for the largest quintile corresponding to retail
purchases. Notably, the difference between the 4th and 5th quintiles is 0.25% for insider purchases,
more than double the 0.10% difference for all observations.

2.4. Empirical results
This section contains the empirical results and briefly discusses their implications. Section
2.4.1 presents the results on whether the return predictability associated with retail trades can be
attributed to insider trades, section 2.4.2 presents the results on interactions between insider and
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retail trading using weekly returns, and section 2.4.3 covers returns to portfolios constructed based
on publicly available information, including longer-term return predictability up to a year after
portfolio formation.

2.4.1 Can the return predictability associated with retail trades be attributed to insider trades?
If the insider subset of retail traders is responsible for the documented retail trade return
predictability, there should be no predictive power for weeks during which no insiders traded. To
test this, I follow Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021) and predict future returns by
estimating Fama-MacBeth regressions. In the first stage, weekly market-adjusted stock returns
with overlapping daily frequencies are regressed on a dummy variable that is equal to one when
retail traders were net buying in the past week and control variables:

𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖,𝑤 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑤−1 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑤 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑤 ,

(2.1)

where 𝑖 refers to stock and 𝑤 to the week (= 5 consecutive trading days), and the control variables
are past returns at various horizons (1 week, 1 month, 6 months) and the firm characteristics
defined in Table 2.3: turnover, volatility, size, and book-to-market ratio. At the second stage,
statistical inference is conducted using the time series of coefficients. To account for serial
correlation in the coefficients induced by using overlapping daily frequency data for weekly
returns and retail trading variables, standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West (1987) with
five lags.
The first specification in Table 2.5 is intended to see if the data corroborates the evidence
that retail trades predict future returns. The sample is unconstrained and only 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑤−1 is
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included as an independent variable. The results show that weekly market-adjusted returns are a
highly significant 141 bps higher when retail traders were net purchasing last week relative to
when they are not. To get a sense of what impact the insider subset of retail traders might have on
this result, the analysis is repeated for the sample where no insiders traded in the previous week.
These results are reported in the second specification and show that retail investors retain almost
the same predictive power during non-insider trading weeks.
Excluding observations where insiders traded during the prior week is sufficient to exclude
potential effects of insiders being a subset of retail investors, but it might not be if one wants to
answer the question of whether retail traders mimicking insiders may drive the results. There could
be a delay between when insiders trade and when retail traders copy those trades. Most insider
trades are disclosed to the SEC and become public within 2 business days as mandated by the SEC,
and it’s not obvious how quickly retail traders would find out and copy them. To be on the
conservative side, the third specification removes observations where at least one insider traded in
the previous four weeks. Retail purchases continue to predict next week’s returns with only a
negligibly changed coefficient. The fourth specification adds control variables to the third (most
conservative) specification, which does not reduce the predictive power associated with retail
purchases. In summary, retail purchases predict future returns, and this is not driven by insiders
being a subset of retail investors nor by the latter group copying insiders.

2.4.2 Interactions among Retail and Insider Traders
This section focuses on the question of whether there is any overlapping information
between retail investors and insiders. To start getting an answer to this question, model (2.1) is
modified to include insider trading dummy variables 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑤−1 and 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑤−1 that
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equal one during weeks when insiders were net buying and selling, respectively (both being zero
when there are no insider trades or when insider purchases exactly equal insider sales). In addition,
interactions between 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑤−1 and the insider trading variables are included.
The results are in Table 2.6, where the first specification confirms that both insider trading
dummy variables predict future weekly returns. As expected, insider purchases predict returns
more strongly than insider sales and retail purchases. The second specification adds
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑤−1 and its estimated coefficient is not far off from what is observed in Table 2.5,
while it also does not materially impact the coefficients on either of the insider trading dummy
variables. The third specification adds the two interactions and uncovers a meaningful positive
interaction between insider and retail purchases. A weaker marginally negative interaction is found
between insider sales and retail purchases, but the effect disappears when adding control variables
in the final specification.
The positive interaction between insider and retail purchases suggests these groups share
positive information, but it’s not yet clear if this could be explained by retail traders mimicking
insider trades. Three tests are conducted in Table 2.7 to answer this question. The first removes
any observations where insider trades could have been copied by retail investors after trades were
disclosed to the SEC. More precisely, observations are excluded where at least one of the insider
trades in week w-1 was disclosed to the SEC within the same week. This filter removes just over
half of the observations that contain insider trades as the median time to disclosure is 2 trading
days resulting from the 2-day SEC disclosure requirement. The results are in the first specification
and show that all coefficients remain of similar magnitudes and statistical significance.
It is, however, in principle possible for retail investors to discover insider trades before
SEC disclosure (through say word of mouth). As a second test, therefore, the second specification
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evaluates retail trading activity one week before insider trades are evaluated. Consistent with the
return predictability associated with retail trades being concentrated in the first week after such
trades (Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang), the coefficient on retail purchases decreases as the
time between these trades and the return increases. The interaction between insider and retail
purchases similarly decreases (although less) and remains significant at the 99% confidence level.
One could argue that these results might still be driven by retail investors copying insider
trades because of positive serial correlation in insider purchases. For instance, if insiders started
buying in week w-2 and continue to buy into week w-1, then if retail traders copied the first insider
purchase this might still result in a positive coefficient on the interaction. To address this concern,
the third specification takes the second specification and further removes all observations where
any insider trade was made in weeks [w-5,w-2]. The interaction effect remains strong. In
conclusion, insider mimicking by retail traders does not drive the positive interaction effect
between insider and retail purchases.
If the results are driven by overlapping positive information, they might be stronger for
subsets of insider trades that are informed, and certainly, the positive interaction should disappear
for subsets that are not informed. Using the algorithms of Cohen et al. (2012) and Ali and
Hirshleifer (2017), Table 2.8 reports returns to routine and opportunistic insider trades as well as
their interactions with retail purchases. The first and third specifications present the non-interacted
results and provide out-of-sample evidence of the two algorithms. Opportunistic purchases (sales)
are followed by positive (negative) returns. Routine purchases are followed by meaningfully
smaller, marginally significant returns and routine sales are not significantly related to future
returns. The second and fourth specifications add the interaction terms and confirm that the only
significant interaction is between opportunistic insider purchases and retail purchases.
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2.4.3 Longer-term and Portfolio Results
So far, all tests have been performed on weekly returns. This section first examines longerterm returns by plotting market-adjusted returns up to a year after 8 conditions based on retail and
insider trading activity. The left chart in Figure 2.1 shows that average cumulative market-adjusted
returns to retail purchases remain relatively flat until 5 months after, when returns reverse and
slightly drop below zero. This pattern is consistent with the reversal of returns in Barrot, Kaniel,
and Sraer (2016). In contrast, returns to insider purchases, and especially those that coincided with
retail purchases, continue to outperform the market up to a year after initiation. Market-adjusted
returns after instances with both insider and retail purchases steadily rise from 0.8% one week after
initiation to 2.7%. In contrast, the returns to insider purchases that coincided with net retail sales
stabilize at 1% around 4 months, with negligible net changes in the following 8 months. This
suggests that the shared information between retail investors and insider is of a long-term nature,
whereas the typical retail trade is not based on long-term information. The right chart focuses on
retail and insider sales, and these trades continue to not have much of a relationship to future
returns.
While interesting and indicative of market dynamics, the results in Figure 2.1 do not control
for known stock return predictors. To address this, portfolios are formed based on insider and retail
trades with different holding periods, and abnormal returns are constructed using both the CAPM
and the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor model augmented with Carhart’s (1997) momentum
factor. More specifically, Table 2.9 reports both equal- and value-weighted weekly alphas to four
portfolios. The first portfolio copies retail investors and is long (short) stocks that have been net
bought (sold) by retail investors in the previous week. All alphas are positive and significant when
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the holding period is 1 week, consistent with the results in Table 2.5. Most of the alpha derives
from small stocks as value-weighted alphas are almost halved in magnitude. All alphas become
insignificant when the holding period is extended to 4 weeks or beyond, consistent with Figure
2.1.
The second portfolio similarly focuses on only one set of participants by copying insider
trades made in the prior week. All alphas are positive and significant up to 4 weeks, whereas valueweighted alphas start to lose some significance for 12-week holding periods. Despite the
continuation of positive returns up to a year after initiation, alphas become largely insignificant
when the holding period is extended to 52 weeks.
The third portfolio mimics insider trades in the past week where retail traders agree (i.e.,
long (short) stocks bought by insiders on days with retail buying (selling)). All alphas are larger
than the individual alphas on retail and insider mimicking portfolios combined, corroborating the
positive interaction found in earlier tests. Value-weighted alphas retain statistical significance at
12 weeks but lose it at 52 weeks. Equal-weighted alphas retain significance even at 52 weeks.
The fourth portfolio mimics insider trades where retail investors disagree (i.e., long (short)
stocks bought by insiders in the past week on days with retail selling (buying)) and earns
substantially smaller abnormal returns relative to the pure insider mimicking portfolio. Its alphas
start to lose some significance at 4-week holding periods, value-weighted alphas are insignificant
at 12 weeks, and all alphas are insignificant at 52 weeks. Taken together, these results suggest that
the nature of the information that is shared between insiders and retail investors is of at least a
medium-term nature.

58

2.5. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the continuing debate on the informational role of retail investors
in financial markets. Using the algorithm of Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021) applied to
U.S. TAQ data to identify retail trades, this paper shows that net buying by retail investors predicts
next week’s stock returns even when no insider traded in the same week or the 3 weeks before that.
This means that the documented return predictability associated with retail trades cannot be
attributed to insiders potentially being a subset of retail investors nor to retail investors copying
insider trades. The change in return predictability between the overall sample and the sample that
excludes observations with insider trades in the previous 4 weeks is negligible (0.141% higher
returns vs. 0.142%, respectively). Insiders trading same-industry stocks other than their own (as in
Ben-David et al., 2019) could still play a role as data limitations do not allow this study to control
for these.
In addition, there exists an interaction between insider and retail purchases that results in
positive abnormal stock returns up to at least 12 weeks. These results are most consistent with
retail traders and insiders sharing positive price-relevant information. No interactions are observed
for insider sales nor routine insider purchases, consistent with these insider trades not containing
much information. Retail traders copying high-value insider trades as in Boehmer, Sang, and
Zhang (2021) and insiders exploiting temporary retail-induced price pressures as in Mansi et al.
(2021) do not explain the results.

59

2.6. References
Babenko, I., Tserlukevich, Y., & Vedrashko, A. (2012). The credibility of open market share
repurchase signaling. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 47(5), 1059-1088.
Barber, B. M., & Odean, T. (2001). Boys will be boys: Gender, overconfidence, and common
stock investment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 261-292.
Barber, B. M., Odean, T., & Zhu, N. (2009). Do retail trades move markets?. The Review of
Financial Studies, 22(1), 151-186.
Barrot, J. N., Kaniel, R., & Sraer, D. (2016). Are retail traders compensated for providing
liquidity?. Journal of Financial Economics, 120(1), 146-168.
Battalio, R., Corwin, S. A., & Jennings, R. (2016). Can brokers have it all? On the relation between
make‐take fees and limit order execution quality. The Journal of Finance, 71(5), 2193-2238.
Ben-David, I., Birru, J., & Rossi, A. (2019). Industry familiarity and trading: Evidence from the
personal portfolios of industry insiders. Journal of Financial Economics, 132(1), 49-75.
Boehmer, E., Jones, C. M., Zhang, X., & Zhang, X. (2021). Tracking retail investor activity. The
Journal of Finance, 76(5), 2249-2305.
Boehmer, E., Sang, B., & Zhang, Z. (2021). Can Retail Investors Learn from Insiders?. Available
at SSRN 3827062.
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of Finance, 52(1),
57-82.
Chung, D. (2020). Detecting insider information in retail trading. Available at SSRN 3479686.
Cziraki, P., & Gider, J. (2021). The dollar profits to insider trading. Review of Finance, 25(5),
1547-1580.
Da, Z., Engelberg, J., & Gao, P. (2011). In search of attention. The Journal of Finance, 66(5),
1461-1499.
Jaffe, J. F. (1974). Special information and insider trading. The Journal of Business, 47(3), 410428.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and
bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 3-56.
Gregoire, V., & Martineau, C. (2021). How Is Earnings News Transmitted to Stock Prices?.
Journal of Accounting Research (forthcoming)
Kaniel, R., Saar, G., & Titman, S. (2008). Individual investor trading and stock returns. The
Journal of Finance, 63(1), 273-310.
Kaniel, R., Liu, S., Saar, G., & Titman, S. (2012). Individual investor trading and return patterns
around earnings announcements. The Journal of Finance, 67(2), 639-680.
Kelley, E. K., & Tetlock, P. C. (2013). How wise are crowds? Insights from retail orders and stock
returns. The Journal of Finance, 68(3), 1229-1265.
60

Kelley, E. K., & Tetlock, P. C. (2017). Retail short selling and stock prices. The Review of
Financial Studies, 30(3), 801-834.
Lakonishok, J., & Lee, I. (2001). Are insider trades informative?. The Review of Financial
Studies, 14(1), 79-111.
Mansi, S. A., Peng, L., Qi, J., & Shi, H. (2021). Retail Investors' Attention and Insider Trading.
Available at SSRN 3831504.
Odean, T. (1998). Are investors reluctant to realize their losses?. The Journal of Finance, 53(5),
1775-1798.
Piotroski, J. D., & Roulstone, D. T. (2005). Do insider trades reflect both contrarian beliefs and
superior knowledge about future cash flow realizations? Journal of Accounting and Economics,
39(1), 55-81.
Seasholes, M. S., & Zhu, N. (2010). Individual investors and local bias. The Journal of
Finance, 65(5), 1987-2010.
Sias, R. W., & Whidbee, D. A. (2010). Insider trades and demand by institutional and individual
investors. The Review of Financial Studies, 23(4), 1544-1595.
Stotz, O. (2012). Do retail investors follow insider trades? German Economic Review, 13(3), 257274.

61

Table 2.1. Sample Selection
This table describes the sample selection procedure from the full sample of insider trades available through
Thomson Reuters (TR) for the years 2010 to 2015, to the final sample that is restricted to insider trades that are (i)
executed as open market purchases or sales; (ii) sufficiently reliable (Thomson Reuters’ cleansing indicators R, H,
L, C, and Y, as in e.g. Alldredge and Cicero (2015)); (iii) successfully merged with CRSP; (iv) involve common
ordinary shares (share codes 10 and 11); and (v-vii) sufficiently reliable and complete (transaction prices do not
exceed more than 10% outside the CRSP-reported high-low range; the daily volume of insider trades does not
exceed the total CRSP-reported volume; and the CRSP data contains prices, returns, and volumes); The sample is
further constructed by (viii) aggregating insider trades to the stock-day level; (ix) adding CRSP data from 2009 and
2016 (to be able to compute lagged and future variables); (x) filtering to 2010-2015, stock-years in which there is
at least 1 retail trade identified on an insider trade day, and stock-years where the stock price remained above $1.
# stocks # obs
Sample selection criteria
9,512
2,224,336
Full TR sample 2010-2015
8,048
774,893
Keep only open market purchases and sales
7,623
760,466
Keep only cleansing indicators R, H, L, C, and Y
5,973
704,547
Merge with CRSP
4,818
643,952
Keep only share codes 10 and 11
4,804
640,053
Keep only transaction prices within [0.9*daily CRSP low,1.1*daily CRSP high]
4,752
627,641
Keep only aggregate insider trades ≤ CRSP reported daily volume
4,711
625,159
Keep only non-missing CRSP price/return/volume data
4,711
255,651
Aggregate individual insider trades to stock-day observations
4,667
7,195,952
Add CRSP data from 2009-2016 for all stocks retained & merge with retail TAQ data
4,476
4,459,334
Keep only 2010-2015, stock-years in which there is at least 1 retail trade identified on
an insider trade day, and stock-years where the stock price remained above $1
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Table 2.2. Sample Characteristics
This table shows the number of observations, mean, and the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of a selection
of variables used in the remainder of the paper. The frequency is daily. Retail purchases and sales are
identified as in Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021): Transactions reported to the FINRA TRF
with prices ending in the interval (0,0.4) cents are identified as retail sales, and those in the interval (0.6,1)
as retail purchases. ROIB is retail order imbalance computed as (retail buy volume – retail sell
volume)/(retail buy volume + retail sell volume) where volumes are in dollars. TURNOVER is the mean
number of shares traded in a month, divided by the total number of shares outstanding, multiplied by the
average number of trading days per month (21), expressed in %. VOLAT is the volatility estimated as the
standard deviation of daily returns per month. BM is the book-to-market ratio, computed at the end of the
previous calendar year.
# obs
mean
p25
median
p75
Retail Purchases (#, daily)
Retail Sales (#, daily)
Retail Purchases ($M, daily)
Retail Sales ($M, daily)
ROIB
Insider Purchases (#, daily)
Insider Sales (#, daily)
Insider Purchases ($M, daily)
Insider Sales ($M, daily)
Volume (#trades)
Volume ($M)
TURNOVER
VOLAT
BM

4,398,791
4,398,791
4,398,791
4,398,791
4,185,447
52,529
194,728
52,529
194,728
4,398,791
4,398,791
4,446,519
4,444,767
4,361,653

118.24
115.17
1.47
1.47
-0.03
2.06
2.55
0.56
1.27
6,123
42.91
17.49
2.38
0.65

5
6
0.01
0.02
-0.28
1
1
0.01
0.08
319
0.57
6.27
1.39
0.29

24
26
0.10
0.11
-0.02
1
1
0.03
0.26
1,596
4.37
12.53
2.01
0.54

86
89
0.53
0.55
0.21
2
2
0.12
0.86
5,801
25.61
22.07
2.95
0.89
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Table 2.3. Correlations.
This table shows correlations for the main sample used in subsequent tests. 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator
variable that equals one when retail buy dollar volume is greater than retail sell dollar volume on day t
for security i, and zero otherwise; 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one when insiders were
net buying on day t and zero otherwise; 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one when insiders
were net selling on day t and zero otherwise. 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑚−1 is the volatility estimated as the standard
deviation of daily returns over the previous month. 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑚−1 is the turnover computed as the mean
number of shares traded in the previous month, divided by the total number of shares outstanding,
multiplied by the average number of trading days per month (21), expressed in %. 𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑦−1 is the bookto-market ratio, computed at the end of the previous calendar year. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑦−1 is defined as the log of the
market capitalization of the previous calendar year.
InsiderBuy InsiderSell
RetailBuy
TURN
VOLAT
BM
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑡
1.00
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝐵𝑢𝑦𝑖,𝑡
0.01***
1.00
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑙𝑖,𝑡
-0.00*
-0.02***
1.00
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑚−1
0.06***
-0.03***
0.03***
1.00
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑚−1
-0.00
0.02***
-0.03***
0.34***
1.00
𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑦−1
-0.06***
0.03***
-0.06***
-0.18***
0.03***
1.00
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑦−1
0.07***
-0.05***
0.08***
0.26***
-0.35***
-0.30***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4. Insider and Retail Trade Characteristics
This table shows the number of insider trades and corresponding average market-adjusted stock returns
for various segments. Panel A reports the number of insider purchases and sales along with subsequent
weekly and annual market-adjusted returns. These statistics are shown for (i) all insider trades, (ii and
iii) trades where retail order imbalance is positive or negative, (iv – vii) opportunistic and routine trades,
using the definitions of opportunistic and routine trades of Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012,
henceforth CMP) and Ali and Hirshleifer (2017, henceforth AH). CMP define routine trades as those
executed by insiders that have traded in the same calendar month for three consecutive years before the
evaluated trades. Opportunistic trades are those made by insiders that have made at least 1 trade in three
consecutive prior years but are not categorized as routine. Insiders that have not traded in at least 3
consecutive prior years are not categorized. AH use the profitability of prior insider trades in the 21
trading days prior to quarterly earnings announcements (QEAs) to distinguish between opportunistic and
routine trades. Profitability is captured by the 5-day stock return centered around QEAs. At the start of
each calendar year, the insiders in the most profitable quintile are deemed opportunistic, and the lower
three quintiles are deemed routine traders. Insiders that have not traded in pre-QEA periods and those in
the fourth quintile are not categorized. Panel B reports subsequent weekly returns by retail order
imbalance quintiles, for (i) all observations, (ii) days with insider purchases only, and (iii) days with
insider sales only. Retail order imbalance (OIB) is defined as (retail buy volume – retail sell
volume)/(retail buy volume + retail sell volume) where volumes are in dollars.
Panel A: Number of insider trades & short and long term returns

All
Retail buy (OIB > 0)
Retail sell (OIB < 0)
Opportunistic (CMP)
Routine (CMP)
Opportunistic (AH)
Routine (AH)

Insider # trades
purchases
Sales
47,283 191,162
24,204
85,098
23,079 106,064
8,513
48,021
6,291
30,489
3,108
16,707
9,323
49,956

[1,5] returns
purchases sales
1.05%
-0.21%
1.17%
-0.19%
0.91%
-0.23%
1.27%
-0.26%
0.10%
-0.05%
1.13%
-0.43%
0.42%
0.02%

[1,252] returns
Purchases Sales
1.86% -0.48%
2.91% -0.53%
0.58% -0.43%
3.23% -1.50%
0.18%
0.07%
3.18% -2.51%
1.13% -0.67%

Panel B: [1,5] returns by retail order imbalance quintiles
Retail OIB Quintile
1 (low)
2
3
4
All
-0.04%
-0.04%
-0.04%
0.01%
Insider Buy
1.36%
1.44%
1.46%
1.47%
Insider Sell
-0.27%
-0.19%
-0.19%
-0.24%

5 (high)
0.11%
1.72%
-0.13%
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Table 2.5. Return Predictability
This table reports estimation results on whether retail trades retain return predictability after controlling
for trading by corporate insiders. Fama-MacBeth regressions are estimated where the dependent variable
is weekly market-adjusted returns. The independent variables include RetailBuy(w-1), a lagged weekly
indicator variable that equals one when retail buy dollar volume is greater than retail sell dollar volume;
Ret(w-1), Ret(m-1), and Ret(m-7,m-2), lagged weekly, monthly, and previous 6-month returns,
respectively; TURNOVER(m-1), lagged monthly turnover computed as the mean number of shares traded
in month m-1, divided by the number of shares outstanding, multiplied by the average number of trading
days per month (21), expressed in %; VOLAT(m-1) is the lagged monthly volatility estimated as the
standard deviation of daily returns per month; SIZE(y-1) is the log market cap at the end of the previous
calendar year; BM(y-1) is the log of the book-to-market ratio, computed at the end of the previous
calendar year. The first specification forms the base; the second specification limits the sample to when
there were no insider trades in week w-1; the third specification limits the sample to when there were no
insider trades between weeks w-4 and w-1; and the final specification adds other control variables to the
sample limited to no insider trades between weeks w-4 and w-1. Standard errors are adjusted using
Newey-West with 5 lags and t-statistics are in parentheses.
No insiders
No Insiders
No Insiders
base
w-1
w-4 to w-1
w-4 to w-1
RetailBuy(w-1)
0.141***
0.140***
0.142***
0.151***
(12.15)
(11.28)
(8.60)
(9.97)
Ret(w-1)
-0.058***
(-12.96)
Ret(m-1)
0.032***
(7.85)
Ret(m-7,m-2)
0.002
(1.37)
TURNOVER(m-1)
-0.003***
(-3.30)
VOLAT(m-1)
0.023
(1.08)
BM(y-1)
-0.035
(-0.97)
SIZE(y-1)
-0.013
(-1.09)
Constant
-0.064
-0.071
-0.082
-0.114
(-0.50)
(-0.57)
(-0.61)
(-0.89)
Observations
R-squared

4,378,235
0.004

3,636,845
0.004

1,943,459
0.004

1,792,249
0.068

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.6. Interactions Retail and Insider Trades.
This table reports estimation results on whether retail purchases retain predictive power when insiders trade.
Fama-MacBeth regressions are estimated where the dependent variable is weekly market-adjusted returns.
The independent variables include RetailBuy(w-1), a lagged weekly indicator variable that equals one when
retail buy dollar volume is greater than retail sell dollar volume; InsiderBuy(w-1), an indicator variable equal
to one when insiders were net buying in the past week and zero otherwise; InsiderSell(w-1), an indicator
variable equal to one when insiders were net selling in the past week and zero otherwise; interaction terms
InsiderBuy(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1), and InsiderSell(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1); and various control variables:
Ret(w-1), Ret(m-1), and Ret(m-7,m-2) are lagged weekly, monthly, and previous 6-month returns,
respectively; TURNOVER(m-1) is lagged monthly turnover computed as the mean number of shares traded
in month m-1, divided by the total number of shares outstanding, multiplied by the average number of
trading days per month (21), expressed in %; VOLAT(m-1) is the lagged monthly volatility estimated as the
standard deviation of daily returns per month; SIZE(y-1) is the log market cap at the end of the previous
calendar year; BM(y-1) is the log of the book-to-market ratio, computed at the end of the previous calendar
year. Standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with 5 lags and t-statistics are in parentheses.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
RetailBuy(w-1)
InsiderBuy(w-1)
InsiderSell(w-1)

0.582***
(16.25)
-0.145***
(-5.74)

0.134***
(11.61)
0.581***
(16.09)
-0.145***
(-5.74)

NO
-0.004
(-0.03)

NO
-0.067
(-0.53)

4,378,235
0.010

4,378,235
0.011

InsiderBuy(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1)
InsiderSell(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1)
Controls
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.132***
(11.21)
0.484***
(11.62)
-0.130***
(-3.93)
0.194***
(3.91)
-0.035*
(-1.70)
NO
-0.070
(-0.58)
4,378,235
0.011

0.134***
(12.50)
0.494***
(14.00)
-0.101***
(-5.03)
0.149***
(3.55)
-0.031
(-1.61)
YES
-0.081
(-0.61)
3,871,675
0.063

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.7. Interaction due to mimicking?
This table reports estimation results on whether retail mimicking of insider trades can explain the interaction
between insider and retail trades. Fama-MacBeth regressions are estimated where the dependent variable is
weekly returns for the sample where there was at least one insider trade in the prior week. The independent
variables include InsiderBuy(w-1), an indicator variable equal to one when insiders were net buying in the
past week and zero otherwise; RetailBuy(w-x), a lagged weekly indicator variable that equals one when retail
buy dollar volume is greater than retail sell dollar volume; and the control variables are defined as in Table
2.5. The first specification excludes observations where insider trades were disclosed to the SEC within the
prior week; the second specification measures RetailBuy one week prior to the week where InsiderBuy is
measured; the third specification further removes observations where insider trades were preceded by at
least one other insider trade in the past 20 trading days. Standard errors are adjusted using Newey-West with
5 lags and t-statistics are in parentheses.
No disclosed insider
No insider trades in
trades in w-1
Unconstrained
[w-5,w-2]
RetailBuy(w-1)
0.133***
(12.17)
RetailBuy(w-2)
0.084***
0.085***
(7.59)
(4.61)
InsiderBuy(w-1)
0.642***
0.481***
0.330***
(14.17)
(12.39)
(14.00)
InsiderSell(w-1)
-0.143***
-0.127***
-0.254***
(-6.35)
(-5.04)
(-13.12)
InsiderBuy(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1)
0.171***
(3.49)
InsiderSell(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1)
-0.041
(-1.43)
InsiderBuy(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-2)
0.145***
0.169***
(3.39)
(3.48)
InsiderSell(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-2)
-0.027
-0.021
(-1.10)
(-0.81)
Controls
YES
YES
YES
Constant
-0.078
-0.068
-0.059
(-0.46)
(-0.49)
(-0.26)
Observations
R-squared

3,590,616
0.063

3,851,327
0.063

1,592,157
0.078

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.8. Opportunistic Trades
This table reports estimation results on whether the interaction effect is observed for routine and
opportunistic insider trades as classified by Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012, henceforth CMP) and
Ali and Hirshleifer (2017, henceforth AH). Fama-MacBeth regressions are estimated where the
dependent variable is weekly market-adjusted returns. Other independent variables are defined in Table
5. The first (last) two specifications use the opportunistic and routine definitions of CMP (AH). Standard
errors are adjusted using Newey-West with 5 lags and t-statistics are in parentheses.
CMP
CMP
AH
AH
RetailBuy(w-1)

Controls
Constant

YES
0.001
(0.00)

0.131***
(12.49)
0.626***
(13.87)
-0.161***
(-6.19)
0.083
(1.60)
-0.025
(-1.27)
0.151***
(3.48)
-0.005
(0.11)
0.015
(0.35)
-0.017
(-0.49)
YES
-0.058
(-0.49)

Observations
R-squared

3,871,675
0.063

3,871,675
0.064

OpportunisticInsiderBuy(w-1)
OpportunisticInsiderSell(w-1)
RoutineInsiderBuy(w-1)
RoutineInsiderSell(w-1)

0.701***
(16.62)
-0.159***
(-6.45)
0.090*
(1.79)
-0.033
(-1.58)

OpportunisticInsiderBuy(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1)
OpportunisticInsiderSell(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1)
RoutineInsiderBuy(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1)
RoutineInsiderSell(w-1)×RetailBuy(w-1)

YES
-0.015
(-0.12)

0.128***
(12.21)
0.613***
(10.82)
-0.231***
(-6.71)
0.125*
(1.72)
0.004
(-0.21)
0.155***
(3.02)
-0.001
(-0.04)
0.057
(1.01)
-0.005
(-0.20)
YES
-0.074
(-0.70)

3,871,675
0.063

3,871,675
0.064

0.683***
(13.08)
-0.231***
(-6.74)
0.154*
(1.95)
0.001
(0.08)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.9. Portfolio Returns.
This table reports weekly excess returns (alpha) on long-short zero net investment portfolios based on
publicly observable information regarding insider and retail trades. The Retail portfolio is long (short)
stocks that have been net bought (sold) by retail traders in the previous week. The Insider portfolio is
long (short) stocks that have been net bought (sold) by insider traders in the previous week. The InsRetail Agree portfolio is long (short) stocks that have been net bought (sold) by insiders while retail
traders were net buying (selling) in the previous week. The Ins-Retail Disagree portfolio is long (short)
stocks that have been net bought (sold) by insiders while retail traders were net selling (buying) in the
previous week. Insider trades that were not disclosed to the SEC by the end of the previous week are
excluded from all insider portfolios. The returns on all portfolios are adjusted for the 4 Carhart (1997)
factors Mkt, SMB, HML, and MOM. Equal-weighted (EW) and value-weighted (VW) alphas are reported
separately. Panel A reports alphas to portfolios with holding periods of 1 week. Panels B, C, and D report
results for holding periods of 4, 12, and 52 weeks, respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses.
Ins-Retail
Ins-Retail
Panel A: 1 week holding period
Retail
Insider
Agree
Disagree
EW CAPM Alpha
0.120***
0.685***
0.885***
0.485***
(2.62)
(6.35)
(8.23)
(4.47)
EW 4-factor Alpha
0.110***
0.764***
0.946***
0.582***
(2.55)
(7.25)
(8.98)
(5.52)
VW CAPM Alpha
0.067**
0.327***
0.433***
0.221**
(2.26)
(3.13)
(4.12)
(2.14)
VW 4-factor Alpha
0.072**
0.405***
0.512***
0.298**
(2.21)
(3.47)
(4.38)
(2.55)
Panel B: 4 week holding period
EW CAPM Alpha
EW 4-factor Alpha
VW CAPM Alpha
VW 4-factor Alpha
Panel C: 12 week holding period
EW CAPM Alpha
EW 4-factor Alpha
VW CAPM Alpha
VW 4-factor Alpha

0.043
(1.08)
0.041
(0.96)
0.023
(0.78)
0.023
(0.79)

0.349***
(5.20)
0.377***
(5.91)
0.174**
(2.56)
0.208***
(2.84)

0.485***
(7.17)
0.509***
(7.54)
0.253***
(3.46)
0.290***
(3.78)

0.212***
(3.20)
0.244***
(3.89)
0.096*
(1.85)
0.125**
(2.14)

0.035
(0.96)
0.031
(0.90)
0.019
(0.80)
0.018
(0.69)

0.194***
(3.56)
0.211***
(4.00)
0.102*
(1.91)
0.117**
(2.01)

0.250***
(4.62)
0.261***
(4.96)
0.127**
(2.38)
0.147**
(2.52)

0.137**
(2.49)
0.160***
(3.03)
0.076
(1.44)
0.087
(1.50)
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Panel D: 52 week holding period
EW CAPM Alpha
EW 4-factor Alpha
VW CAPM Alpha
VW 4-factor Alpha

0.005
(0.16)
-0.002
(-0.07)
-0.010
(-0.51)
-0.004
(-0.18)

0.057
(1.46)
0.065*
(1.73)
0.025
(0.68)
0.031
(0.74)

0.077**
(2.13)
0.086**
(2.45)
0.031
(0.87)
0.038
(0.98)

0.037
(0.79)
0.044
(1.02)
0.020
(0.48)
0.023
(0.49)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 2.1. Market-adjusted returns to insider and retail trading over time.
The figure shows average cumulative market-adjusted stock returns under eight conditions based on retail and insider trading activity. The chart on
the left shows future market-adjusted returns to stocks that (i) were net bought by retail traders in the previous week, (ii) were net bought by insiders
in the previous week, (iii) were net bought by both retail traders and insiders in the previous week, (iv) were net bought (sold) by insiders (retail
traders) in the previous week. The chart on the right shows future market-adjusted returns to stocks that (v) were net sold by retail traders in the
previous week, (vi) were net sold by insiders in the previous week, (vii) were net bought (sold) by retail traders (insiders) in the previous week, and
(viii) were net sold by both retail traders and insiders in the previous week.
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Chapter 3. RETAIL TRADING AROUND EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS
3.1 Introduction
What is the role of retail traders in stock pricing? Are they noise traders as in Black (1986),
or are they as a group able to predict stock returns? The literature has not yet settled on an answer
as previous studies provide mixed empirical results. On the one hand, there is ample evidence of
individual investors suffering from behavioral biases such as the disposition effect, overconfidence,
and the familiarity bias (e.g., Odean, 1998; Barber and Odean, 2001; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010).
Moreover, some studies find a negative association between overall retail trading and future
returns (Odean, 1999; Barber, Odean, and Zhu, 2009). On the other hand, recent studies using
comprehensive datasets tend to find that aggregated retail trades can predict returns (Kaniel, Liu,
Saar, and Titman, 2012; Kelley and Tetlock, 2013; Fong, Gallagher, and Lee, 2014; Barrot, Kaniel,
and Sraer, 2016; Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang, 2021).
This study extends the prior literature on retail investor stock trading by using a recent and
comprehensive U.S. dataset and focusing on earnings announcements. I focus on earnings
announcements because informed individuals may be especially active around times when
earnings information is released to the market. Moreover, individuals may trade more aggressively
on such information than institutions before earnings releases if institutions are reluctant to do so
due to reduced liquidity or out of fear of litigation. Consistent with retail traders being informed,
I document that their pre-announcement trading predicts earnings surprises, announcement returns,
and medium-term post-announcement returns.
Can these results be explained in light of the evidence that retail traders trade sub-optimally
and that institutions tend to be informed? One possibility is that while many retail traders are
uninformed, there is a subset of individuals that is informed. I estimate the extent to which my
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results are driven by two such groups of individuals: corporate insiders and a group of hackers that
had access to earnings figures several hours before public disclosures.
When Kaniel et al. (2012) find that retail trades predict earnings announcements, they note
that it remains an open question whether these results can be attributed to corporate insiders that
constitute a part of their individual trader dataset. There are good reasons to believe the answer is
affirmative. It is well known that insiders tend to be informed (Jaffe, 1974, Lakonishok and Lee,
2001; Ben-David, Birru, and Rossi, 2019). While insiders constitute a small fraction of all
individual traders and the typical dollar profits to insider trades are modest, they trade in relatively
large amounts (Cziraki and Gider, 2020). Moreover, Lee, Lemmon, Li, and Sequeira (2014) find
that insiders continue to trade on private information through pre-approved trades even as they
face trade restrictions in the days leading up to earnings announcements. Furthermore, Ali and
Hirshleifer (2017) find that trades executed by insiders, who have historically profited from preannouncement trades, better predict subsequent abnormal returns than other insider trades. As such,
the contribution of pre-announcement insider trades to the informedness of retail traders could be
sizable.
Providing more suggestive evidence of the importance of this channel, Chung (2020) finds
that in a general context that is not limited to earnings announcements at least half of the predictive
power of retail trades for future returns can be attributed to insider trading. However, in the context
of earnings announcements, this does not appear to be the case; my results are similarly strong for
the sample that excludes earnings announcements where insiders traded before the announcement.
My sample may also have relatively fewer insiders among retail traders compared to Kaniel et al.
(2012) and Chung (2020) as argued in section 3.2.1.
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Turning to the aforementioned group of hackers, there are also reasons to believe they may
significantly impact the aggregate predictive power of retail trades. By hacking several major
newswire services, they gained early access to earnings that had been uploaded to these services
before being released publicly. The hackers traded on this valuable information and did so quite
aggressively, making more than 100 million dollars in profits. They potentially had early access
to nearly 10,000 quarterly earnings reports (about 12% of my sample), with at least several hundred
known cases of illegal trading according to publicly available court documents. To determine the
extent to which the predictive power of retail trades is driven by these hackers, I first exclude the
last day before earnings announcements from the analysis. This ensures that the sample contains
few, if any, hacker trades because earnings figures were uploaded onto the newswires in the late
morning or early afternoon to be released after markets closed. The evidence regarding earnings
surprises becomes considerably weaker.
However, if the hackers are primarily driving the results, the evidence should also be weaker
when the analysis is restricted to earnings news where hackers were unsuccessful or inactive. Akey,
Gregoire, and Martineau (2021) find that the hackers focused on large stocks, whereas my evidence
extends to small stocks. Taken together, these findings suggest that much of retail trades predictive
power for earnings surprises is driven by individuals, who trade opportunistically the day before
the announcement, but that not all of them possess hacked press releases. It remains an open
question whether these individuals constitute a large diverse group or a small subset of retail
traders.
In addition to studying the role of insiders and hackers in informed retail trading around
earnings announcements, the 2010-2015 sample examined in this paper is more recent and
arguably more representative of retail traders compared to earlier studies. The sample is
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constructed as in Boehmer et al. (2021) using public TAQ data, and its construction relies on the
practice of brokers to offer marginally better prices to retail orders through internalization or to
route them to market makers who offer price improvement. Boehmer et al. (2021) estimate that
this approach identifies about one-half of all self-directed retail trades.
In contrast, Kaniel et al. (2012) use U.S. data from the NYSE, which may not be as
representative because retail brokers have incentives to route retail orders away from the NYSE as
other venues offer to pay brokers for execution (Battalio and Loughran, 2008). Indeed, Barber,
Odean, and Zhu (2009) show that most discount retail brokers route fewer than 1% of orders to
the NYSE during the 2000-2003 sample period in Kaniel et al. (2012).
Further to the advantages of my sample, Kelley and Tetlock (2013) show that retail market
orders can predict earnings surprises, whereas limit orders have negligible predictive power. Their
data originate from one market maker during 2003-2007. My data only include marketable orders,
but are not limited to one market maker, capturing about three times the retail volume in terms of
percentage shares of total volume.
Boehmer et al. (2021) also study earnings announcements but focus on retail trades executed
the week prior to the announcements. They find that the predictive power of retail order imbalances
nearly doubles on earnings announcement weeks, but the increase is not statistically significant. I
use their algorithm to construct nearly the same sample but expand the analysis to focus on preannouncement trading and its relation to earnings surprises, earnings announcement returns, and
post-earnings returns. My results are stronger because the predictive power of retail trades is
concentrated in the final day prior to earnings announcements, whereas this activity is not captured
in most of the weekly regressions performed by Boehmer et al. (2021).
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Michels (2021) uses Robinhood data to infer that returns to both positive and negative
earnings surprises are higher when more retail traders hold the stock the day after earnings relative
to the day before. In contrast, Friedman and Zeng (2021) combine Robinhood and TAQ data and
utilize exogenous Robinhood outages to infer that increased retail trading activity is associated
with increased price responsiveness to earnings surprises for both negative and positive surprises.
These papers focus on contemporaneous and post-earnings retail trading activity whereas my paper
focuses on pre-announcement retail trades.
More generally (not specific to earnings news), Welch (2022) finds, using Robinhood data
from 2018 through 2020, that a representative portfolio of the average Robinhood user generates
positive alpha. On the other hand, Barber, Huang, Odean, and Schwarz (2022) find that attentiondriven retail trading through Robinhood strongly negatively predicts future returns. In addition,
Barber et al. (2022) argue that retail investor trading activity is changing due to gamification and
simplicity through fintech applications such as Robinhood. These studies highlight the continuing
debate on the information content of retail traders, to which this paper contributes. However, they
have limited impact on my results because the popularity of these applications was limited during
the 2010-2015 period I study (e.g., the Robinhood app launched in March 20158).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data, sample, and
preliminary results. Section 3 contains main empirical results. Section 4 concludes.

8

https://blog.robinhood.com/news/2015/3/11/start-investing-stop-paying
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3.2. Data, retail trading imbalance measures, and sample
3.2.1 Data
The sample includes all ordinary common shares from January 2010 to December 2015.
Retail trading is identified using TAQ data and applying Boehmer et al.’s (2021) algorithm, which
exploits the fact that retail orders usually receive price improvement in fractional pennies. This
means that trades are executed at a price that is better than quoted – for example, if the best quoted
ask price for a security is $35.00, and a retail client places a market order to buy, a broker can
choose to internalize this order at $34.999 offering one tenth of a penny price improvement. Such
price improvement can also occur when brokers route orders to wholesalers, which are market
makers that combine order flow from multiple sources.
Typically, price improvements in sub-pennies are smaller than half a cent, meaning that the
price at which transactions are executed provides a way to distinguish retail sales from retail buys.
Most retail transactions that are price-improved do not take place on exchanges and instead are
reported to a FINRA Trade Reporting Facility (TRF). The procedure to identify retail trades is to
take the transactions reported to TRFs and flag transactions with prices ending in the interval (0,
0.4) cents as retail sales and those in the interval (0.6, 1) as retail purchases.
While data on sub-penny price improvements are available from 2005, there is an upward
trend in the number of sub-penny trades, likely because the practice of offering price improvement
for retail trades in sub-pennies was increasingly adopted. The trend continues until 2010 and then
stabilizes. In 2016, the tick size pilot program came into effect, affecting the ability to offer price
improvement for many stocks. Therefore, I chose to use the same 2010-2015 sample period as in
Boehmer et al. (2021).
It is conceivable that insider trades constitute a smaller portion of retail trades in my data
compared to the NYSE data of Kaniel et al. (2012) or Chung (2020). The wholesalers have
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incentives to avoid taking the other side of insider trades because these trades are usually informed.
Meanwhile, brokers know which of their clients are insiders because of the requirement to selfidentify. From the legal standpoint, agreements between brokers and wholesalers give the latter
the right to reject large orders,9 and insider trades are typically much larger than the average retail
trade. Rejected orders might instead be placed on an exchange such as the NYSE and captured as
retail trades in studies based on the NYSE data.
Further as to why insider trades may be appearing less in my data, many firms have special
policies on insider trading plans. For instance, some companies require employees to use a “captive”
broker for insider plans,10 which may execute trades differently than typical retail brokers. Finally,
the data also show that at least 50% of insider trades are larger than retail trading volume on the
same day for the same stock, suggesting that a large proportion of insider trades is not captured as
retail trades.
Stock returns and characteristics are taken from CRSP, book-to-market values are computed
using data from Compustat, and the data on insider trades and insider characteristics come from
Thomson Reuters. Quarterly earnings announcements are taken from both Compustat and I/B/E/S
where in less than 1% of the data the dates are in conflict. If this happens, the earlier date of the
two is used to avoid any potential look-ahead bias. Day 0 is defined as the trading day on which
announcements are made or the first trading day after if they occur after trading hours. Although
I/B/E/S timestamps are systematically delayed (Bradley, Lee, Clarke, and Ornthanalai, 2014), the
observations at 4 p.m. are assumed to correspond to after-market hours because almost all earnings
are announced outside regular trading hours11. For some analyses, earnings announcements are

9

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/316709/000031670904000037/exh10_262.txt, section II (a) (i).
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/03/24/a-guide-to-rule-10b5-1-plans/
11
Gregoire and Martineau (2021) report that after adjusting timestamps using Ravenpack, over 99% of earnings
announcements of S&P 1500 firms from 2011 to 2015 take place outside of market hours.
10
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separated into positive and nonpositive earnings surprises, where positive surprises are those where
the actual earnings were higher than the median analyst estimate provided by I/B/E/S.
For earnings announcements in Compustat that could not be matched to I/B/E/S
announcements, comprising 18% of the sample, no timestamps are available. For these
observations, I assume that the earnings were announced before markets close to be conservative
and prevent misclassifying some post-announcement retail trading as having occurred pre-event.
The main results continue to hold when excluding these announcements. Whereas these data issues
introduce some noise to 1-day announcement returns, the impact is smaller on returns evaluated
over longer horizons used in this paper (ranging from 2 to 60 days).

3.2.2 Sample
The sample starts with 5,877 stocks from the CRSP universe with share codes 10 and 11 and
is merged with I/B/E/S, Compustat, and TAQ. Non-missing retail trade data are required on the
day of the announcements and the calendar year’s stock price minimum must be at least $1.00 (this
means that if the stock price has dropped below $1 in say 2011 but remained above it in other
years, only the 2011 data for this stock are dropped). The final sample consists of 4,919 stocks
with 80,685 earnings announcements. The sample selection procedure is summarized in Table 3.1.
To gain a better understanding of the data, the sample characteristics are described in Table 3.2.
Results are shown for all trading days (Panel A) and for the earnings announcement days (Panel
B). On days with earnings announcements, there is generally higher overall trading volume and
higher retail volume, by a factor of nearly 3, with the factor being somewhat greater for retail
volume compared to the overall volume. Retail order imbalance (as used by for instance Boehmer
et al., 2021) is defined for a stock i on day t as
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𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑏𝑢𝑦 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒

– 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒

𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑏𝑢𝑦 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖,𝑡 ,
𝑖,𝑡

𝑖,𝑡

(3.1)

where volumes are expressed in shares.
Barber and Odean (2008) argue that retail investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing
stocks. If earnings announcements only draw attention to the stocks, we may expect the same
phenomenon. However, in my sample, retail order imbalance is negative on announcement days.
Unsurprisingly, returns are more volatile on news days, while the average return is very similar,
and the median return is the same at 0%.
When there are no retail trades identified on a trading day for a particular security, the
number of retail trades is set to zero. In these instances, retail order imbalance has a division-byzero problem resulting in missing values and a lower number of observations. Also note that
volatility, turnover, size, book-to-market ratios, and stock prices are only reported for the full
sample because the reported statistics are very similar for the two samples by construction.
For a preview of the results and to gain a better sense of the data, Table 3.3 contains
correlations for the primary variables used in the remainder of the paper, for the sample restricted
to earnings announcement days. The sign of an earnings surprise is related to various variables that
are known prior to the announcements. In particular, cumulative retail order imbalances in the 10
and 60 days prior to earnings announcements are positively correlated with the sign of earnings
surprises, suggesting that (at least some) retail traders are informed. However, both these
imbalances and the sign of earnings surprises are correlated to volatility, turnover, market
capitalization, and the book-to-market ratio. It is thus important to control for these variables in
the earnings surprise tests.
Cumulative retail order imbalances are also positively correlated to returns on event days
but not as strongly as to the earnings surprises. Interestingly, the signs of the correlations of returns
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with the four control variables run opposite to the signs of the correlations of these measures with
the direction of the earnings surprise and the cumulative retail order imbalances. This shows that
predicting earnings surprises does not necessarily translate to predicting returns, so it is worthwhile
to determine whether any predictive power of retail trading on earnings surprises translates to stock
returns. Therefore, in the next section, I separately test the predictive power of cumulative retail
order imbalances on earnings surprises and on returns.
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3.3. Empirical results
3.3.1 Graphical results
Before turning to formal regression analyses, I plot returns and retail order imbalances
around earning announcements in Figure 3.1 and discuss the underlying intuition. Both charts
comprise a 21-day event window period centered on day 0. The graph on the left shows the
difference between cumulative market-adjusted returns to stocks experiencing positive earnings
surprises and nonpositive surprises. These differences are plotted for stocks separated into three
market capitalization groups, defined as in Kaniel et al. (2012): large (top three deciles), medium
(next three deciles), and small (bottom four deciles). Daily market-adjusted returns are defined as
daily stock returns minus the average equal-weighted daily return on the stocks in the sample.
For each size group, average returns to stocks that are about to experience positive earnings
surprises are slightly increasing relative to those that will experience nonpositive surprises. This
is consistent with superior forecasting relative to the available analyst forecasts or some leakage
of earnings information. Post-earnings announcement drifts appear to be primarily if not only
observed for small stocks, consistent with Martineau (2021) and those stocks being less
informationally efficient.
The graph on the right is similarly constructed as the one on the left but with cumulative
retail order imbalances instead of returns. For each size group, the difference in these imbalances
increases in the days prior to earnings news. This means that retail investors tend to buy more
stocks that are about to experience positive earnings surprises relative to those that are about to
experience nonpositive surprises, suggesting that some retail traders are informed. The trend is
strongest for small stocks, consistent with the notion that superior earnings forecasting is easier
for these stocks for retail investors. Informed retail trading activity appears to be concentrated on
the final day prior to earnings news which might be attributable to the aforementioned hackers,
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who only had early access for several hours (and are primarily recorded at day -1 because most
earnings were released after market hours).
After earnings are released, cumulative imbalances stabilize for small stocks while retail
traders tend to temporarily trade contrarian for the roughly 5 days after earnings surprises for large
and medium stocks. In contrast, using a richer but smaller dataset over nearly the same period
(2010-2014), Luo, Ravina, and Viceira (2020) find that retail trading is contrarian after large
earnings surprises for small stocks. The reconciliation of these findings is left to future research
utilizing more detailed transaction data.
Overall, these graphical results tell us that prior to earnings announcements, the overall
patterns are not much different for the different size groups. Some interesting differing patterns
emerge after announcements, but the focus of this paper is on pre-announcement retail trading.
Therefore, I do not separately analyze different size stocks in the remaining regression analyses.

3.3.2 Regression Analyses
The results discussed above seem to indicate that retail order flow predicts earnings surprises.
However, the correlation analysis discussed in section 2.2 reveals the need to control for various
measures. To formalize the analysis, I follow Kelley and Tetlock (2013) and estimate the following
logistic regression model:
Let 𝑝(𝑥) = P(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒[𝑥, 𝑦]𝑖 | 𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠). Estimate
𝑝(𝑥) =

1
1+𝑒

𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖

(3.2)

where 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒[𝑥, 𝑦]𝑖 equals 1 if there is a positive earnings surprise
between days 𝑥 and 𝑦, and 0 if the surprise is nonpositive. This structure tests whether retail flow
predicts an upcoming earnings surprise between 𝑥 and 𝑦 days into the future. To be consistent with
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Kelley and Tetlock (2013), I use [1,5] and [6,20] days as values for 𝑥 and 𝑦. As a robustness check,
I also use [2,5] that excludes retail trading on the last day prior to the earnings announcements to
account for the fact that a sizeable group of hackers was actively trading on this day during the
sample period.
An earnings surprise is defined to be positive when the reported earnings are higher than the
I/B/E/S provided median analyst estimate of the earnings. 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0 is the retail order imbalance as
defined earlier at event time 0. Control variables are the same as in Kelley and Tetlock (2013),
augmented with volatility and turnover measures as in Boehmer et al. (2021). Specifically, these
are the stock returns at time 0; lagged returns from time -5 to -1 (in trading days) and from time 26 to -6; volatility estimated as the standard deviation of daily returns over the previous month;
turnover computed as the mean daily number of shares traded in the previous month, divided by
the total number of shares outstanding, and multiplied by 21 (the average number of trading days
per month); size defined as the log of the market capitalization at the end of the previous calendar
year, and the book-to-market ratio computed at the end of the previous calendar year.
The results are in Table 3.4. The main coefficient 𝛽1 is positive and significant for earnings
surprises in the 5 trading days ahead, implying that aggregate retail trading activity predict earnings
surprises. Economically, when evaluated at the means of the independent variables, if retail order
𝑒 0.34+0.046∗0.078

𝑒 0.34

imbalance increases by one standard deviation, there is a 0.87% (= 1+𝑒 0.34+046∗0.078 − 1+𝑒 0.34 )
increase in the likelihood of a positive earnings surprise if the announcement is due in 1 to 5 days.
When the horizon is changed to [2,5] days in the second specification, the predictability largely
disappears and the marginal effect of a one-standard deviation reduces to 0.30%. The predictive
power is thus concentrated in the last day, perhaps because of the aforementioned hackers.
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Retail order imbalance also fails to predict earnings surprises in the [6,20] event time period.
In contrast, Kelley and Tetlock (2013) find positive and significant order imbalance coefficients
for both the [1,5] and [6,20] time windows, while their magnitude and significance are also
considerably lower for the latter. These findings are consistent with Figure 3.1, where the
differential retail order imbalance measures start to rise around 5 days prior to earnings
announcements, and primarily so on the last day.
Despite restrictions on insider trading prior to earnings announcements, 10% of the
observations are preceded by insider trades in the two weeks prior to the earnings announcements.
There is thus a sizeable number of insiders who manage to trade during these periods, presumably
through pre-approved transactions that predict earnings (Lee, Lemmon, Li, and Sequeira, 2014).
To determine how much of the retail order evidence might be driven by insiders, Table 3.5 Panel
A shows the results for the sample excluding announcements preceded by insider trades. The
evidence regarding earnings surprises in the next 5 days weakens somewhat while the
predictability disappears in the [2,5] period and remains absent in the [6,20] period.
To delve deeper into the question of how much of the predictive power on day -1 is related
to hackers, Panels B and C show the results for samples that were unlikely targets for hackers.
Akey et al. (2021) argue that hackers are more likely to target stocks that are liquid, easy to short,
and where they are more certain about the signal of the hacked earnings. They further argue that
stocks with low institutional ownership are less liquid and/or have more short-selling constraints,
and signals are less precise when analyst coverage is low, thus making them less attractive targets.
They go on to show that there is no evidence of hacked press releases impacting prices for these
subsamples. Consistent with hackers being largely responsible for the predictability of earnings
surprises in the [1,5] period, retail order imbalances fail to predict surprises for stocks with low
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institutional ownership. However, retail order flow continues to predict earnings surprises for the
low analyst coverage sample for [1,5] days, and there is even evidence of predictability for [6,20]
days for this sample. The enhanced predictability is consistent with the analysts’ earnings estimates
being less accurate and thus more easily improved upon by retail traders.
Given that retail traders appear to predict earnings surprises, and that positive earnings
surprises are on average accompanied by positive returns (Figure 3.1), it seems likely that retail
imbalances can predict earnings announcement returns. However, it does not immediately follow
because they could be forecasting earnings superior to the median known earnings forecast but not
relative to the implied market consensus as measured by returns. In addition, various variables are
correlated to the sign of earnings surprises and earnings announcement returns in the opposite
direction, even though positive earnings are typically accompanied by positive returns.
The return predictability analysis is formalized with the aim to determine whether retail order
flow predicts returns, and if it does, whether it extends beyond the information contained in
earnings surprises. Market-adjusted returns over the [0,1] trading period are regressed on
cumulative retail order imbalances, pre-announcement cumulative abnormal returns, and earnings
surprise quintiles. Cumulative imbalances and returns are computed over horizons [-10,-1] and [60,-1] to be consistent with Kaniel et al. (2012).
To correct for possibly contemporaneously correlated errors for earnings announcements
that are clustered in time, I employ the Fuller-Battese (1974) methodology as in Kaniel et al. (2012)
and the results are found in Table 3.6. Panel A shows the results for the full sample, where the
first specification shows that cumulative retail order imbalances over the 10 pre-announcement
days predict announcement returns after controlling for pre-announcement returns. The second
specification shows that this predictability is robust to controlling for earnings surprises,
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confirming the findings of Kaniel et al. (2012). A larger reduction in return predictability is
observed for the [-60,-1] event window, but the result remains significant.
Kaniel et al. (2012) ponder whether their results are driven by corporate insiders or by a
larger group of retail traders. To determine if these results are driven by insiders, in Table 3.7 panel
A I exclude earnings announcements with insider trades in the 10 trading days prior to the
announcement. As in Table 3.4, this excludes just over 10% of the events while the results are
similar (if anything, stronger) for this subsample. I conclude that the predictive power of retail
order imbalances for future earnings announcement returns is not driven by insider trading. To
account for the hackers, I again drop the last day prior to the announcements and show the results
in Panel B. Contrary to estimating earnings surprises, the evidence remains strong for returns.
Taken together, the results do not suggest that the earnings surprise predictability is only driven
by hacked earnings announcements. Future research could provide a more definitive answer by
excluding the stocks that have been hacked.
Finally, I follow Kaniel et al. (2012) in evaluating the predictive power of pre-announcement
retail trades of post-earnings announcement returns. Table 3.8 is similar to Table 3.6 with the
independent variable evaluated over the 60 trading days after earnings announcements (i.e.,
approximately up to the next quarterly earnings announcement). The results show that predictive
power of retail trading extends beyond the immediate announcement return, with similar statistical
significance as for announcement returns. Economically, the coefficients are two to three times as
large, while the return horizon is thirty times larger. This suggests that while the return
predictability of retail order flow extends beyond earnings announcement returns, it is concentrated
around them. Given that there is no strong post-earnings announcement drift in this sample, it is
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not surprising that the inclusion of earnings surprise quintiles in the regressions has a smaller effect
on the other coefficients.
In a similar spirit to the previous analyses, Table 3.9 show that the results are robust to
controlling for insider trades and excluding the last day prior to earnings announcements. The
statistical significance becomes weaker for the latter subsample with 60-day returns while the
magnitudes of the relevant coefficients only reduce by about 5%.
3.4. Conclusion
Using a comprehensive U.S. dataset covering 2010-2015, I find that retail traders tend to
trade in the same direction as future earnings surprises. This predictive power is not driven by
insider trades; however, it is driven in part by individuals who trade on the last day prior to
announcements, potentially including a group of hackers who gained access to earnings news
before the public.
After controlling for lagged returns and the strength of the earnings surprise, preannouncement retail trades predict both earnings announcement returns and the 3-month postearnings returns. These results are not driven by insiders nor individuals trading on the last day
prior to earnings announcements. Overall, the data are consistent with retail traders encountering
unpriced valuable information and trading on it.
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Table 3.1. Sample Selection
This table describes the sample selection procedure from the full sample of CRSP stocks with share
codes 10 and 11 to the sample that is restricted to earnings announcements (EAs) that (i) are matched
to the CRSP data, (ii) have non-missing retail trade volume data, and (iii) have corresponding stock
prices that stay above $1, evaluated by calendar year.
#Stocks
#EAs
5,877
CRSP universe restricted to share codes 10 and 11
5,169
91,688
Require at least 1 identified earnings announcement
5,100
86,061
Merge with Retail TAQ data
4,919
80,685
Stock price > $1 for the entire calendar year
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Table 3.2. Sample Characteristics
This table shows the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, and the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th,
and 90th percentiles of a selection of variables used in the remainder of the paper, for the sample of
earnings announcements (panel A) and the full sample (panel B). The frequency is daily unless otherwise
specified. Retail purchases and sales are identified as in Boehmer, Jones, Zhang, and Zhang (2021):
Transactions reported to a FINRA TRF with prices ending in the interval (0,0.4) cents are identified as
retail sales and those in the interval (0.6,1) as retail purchases. 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,0 is the gross stock return of stock 𝑖.
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0 is retail order imbalance computed as (retail buy volume – retail sell volume)/(retail buy volume
+ retail sell volume) where volumes are in number of shares traded. 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑚−1 , the volatility estimated
as the standard deviation of daily returns over the previous month; 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑚−1 is the turnover computed
as the mean number of shares traded in the previous month, divided by the total number of shares
outstanding, multiplied by the average number of trading days per month (21), expressed in %. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑦−1
is defined as the log of the market capitalization of the previous calendar year. 𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑦−1 is the book-tomarket ratio, computed at the end of the previous calendar year. All continuous variables are winsorized
at 1% and 99%.
Panel A: Full sample
#obs
Retail Purchases (#)
5,092,177
Retail Sales (#)
5,092,177
Retail Purchases ($M)
5,092,177
Retail Sales ($M)
5,092,177
Volume (#)
5,092,177
Volume ($M)
5,092,177
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,0 (%)
5,182,088
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑙 𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0
4,801,943
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑚−1
5,166,627
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑚−1
5,168,154
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑦−1
5,165,916
𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑦−1
4,686,149
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
5,182,088
Panel B: Earnings announcement days only
Retail Purchases (#)
80,685
Retail Sales (#)
80,685
Retail Purchases ($M)
80,685
Retail Sales ($M)
80,685
Volume (#)
80,685
Volume ($M)
80,685
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,0 (%)
81,671
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0
77,293

mean
109
106
1.31
1.31
5627
38.59
0.07
-0.04
2.45
16.83
13.30
0.65
29.44

sd
414
357
11.13
10.72
13625
181.89
3.06
0.46
1.52
17.85
1.98
0.57
63.08

p25
4
5
0.01
0.01
236
0.40
-1.14
-0.29
1.42
5.52
11.87
0.28
7.72

median
21
22
0.08
0.09
1339
3.36
0.00
-0.03
2.07
11.83
13.24
0.54
17.40

p75
77
80
0.45
0.47
5132
21.40
1.19
0.21
3.04
21.33
14.63
0.88
36.17

292
278
3.77
3.73
13163
99.05
0.08
-0.03

1035
843
23.41
22.89
29083
407.39
7.51
0.39

10
11
0.03
0.03
443
0.83
-2.94
-0.21

57
60
0.25
0.27
3203
9.19
0.00
-0.02

217
222
1.45
1.51
13319
63.23
2.99
0.15
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Table 3.3. Correlations.
This table shows correlations computed using the sample restricted to eligible earnings announcement
days. 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0 is retail order imbalance computed as (retail buy volume – retail sell volume)/(retail buy
volume + retail sell volume) where volumes are in number of shares traded.
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦] are cumulative retail order imbalances from days 𝑥 to 𝑦. 𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖,0 is an indicator variable that
is equal to one when there is a positive earnings surprise of stock 𝑖 on day 0, and zero when there is a
nonpositive earnings surprise. An earnings surprise is positive when the earnings are higher than the
I/B/E/S median analyst estimate, and nonpositive otherwise. 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,0 is the gross stock return of stock 𝑖
on day 0. 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑚−1 is the volatility estimated as the standard deviation of daily returns over the
previous month. 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑚−1 is the turnover computed as the mean number of shares traded in the
previous month, divided by the total number of shares outstanding, multiplied by the average number of
trading days per month (21), expressed in %. 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑦−1 is defined as the log of the market capitalization
of the previous calendar year. 𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑦−1 is the book-to-market ratio, computed at the end of the previous
calendar year.
ROIB
ROIB
ROIB
PES
RET
VOLAT TURN
SIZE
[-60,-1]

𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[−10,−1]
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[−60,−1]
𝑃𝐸𝑆𝑖,0
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,0
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑚−1
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑚−1
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑦−1
𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑦−1

[-10,-1]

1.00
0.11***

1.00

0.09***

0.77***

1.00

0.01***

0.02***

1.00

0.01*

0.01*

0.27***

0.02***

0.02***

0.06***

-0.01**

1.00

0.04***

0.02***

0.03***

-0.03***

0.34***

0.12***

-0.01

-0.00
0.01*
-0.03***
0.00
0.02***

0.03***

0.03***

-0.04***

0.01*
-0.03***

-0.03***

1.00

0.01**

1.00

-0.39***

0.22***

0.03***

-0.13***

1.00
-0.27***
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Table 3.4. Predicting Earnings Surprises
This table reports results of daily logistic regressions estimating the sign of earnings surprises. The
dependent variable is the log-odds of 𝑃𝐸𝑆[𝑥, 𝑦]𝑖 , which is equal to one when there is a positive earnings
surprise between days 𝑥 and 𝑦, and zero when there is a nonpositive earnings surprise. An earnings
surprise is positive when the earnings are higher than the I/B/E/S median analyst estimate, and
nonpositive otherwise. The independent variable is retail order imbalance 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0 . It is defined as (retail
buy dollar volume – retail sell dollar volume)/(retail buy dollar volume + retail sell dollar volume), and
is evaluated at day 0. The control variables include the same-day return 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,0 ; lagged returns
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,[−5,−1] and 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,[−26,−6]; 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑚−1 , the volatility estimated as the standard deviation of daily
returns over the previous month; turnover 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑚−1 computed as the mean number of shares traded in
the previous month, divided by the total number of shares outstanding, multiplied by the average number
of trading days per month (21), expressed in %; 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑦−1 defined as the natural logarithm of the market
capitalization of the previous calendar year; and 𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑦−1 , the book-to-market ratio computed at the end
of the previous calendar year. At least 50 observations are required for each daily regression. Average
coefficients and standard errors adjusted for Newey and West (1987) with 5 lags are reported.
𝑃𝐸𝑆[1,5]𝑖
𝑃𝐸𝑆[2,5]𝑖
𝑃𝐸𝑆[6,20]𝑖
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0
0.078***
0.027*
0.003
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.009)
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,0
0.038***
0.028***
0.013***
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.002)
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,[−5,−1]
0.023***
0.024***
0.014***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑖,[−26,−6]
0.016***
0.015***
0.011***
(0.001)
(0.001)
(0.001)
𝑉𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑚−1
-0.017***
-0.036***
-0.052***
(0.007)
(0.008)
(0.004)
𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑚−1
0.003***
0.003***
0.005***
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑦−1
0.157***
0.147***
0.170***
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.013)
𝐵𝑀𝑖,𝑦−1
-0.125***
-0.127***
-0.111***
(0.012)
(0.013)
(0.008)
Observations
Average Pseudo R-squared

270,717
0.086

207,992
0.082

820,834
0.065

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.5. Predicting Earnings Surprises in Subsamples
This table reports results of daily logistic regressions estimating the sign of earnings surprises. The
dependent variable is 𝑃𝐸𝑆[𝑥, 𝑦]𝑖 , which is equal to one when there is a positive earnings surprise between
days 𝑥 and 𝑦, and zero when there is a nonpositive earnings surprise. An earnings surprise is positive
when the earnings are higher than the I/B/E/S median analyst estimate, and nonpositive otherwise. The
independent variable is retail order imbalance 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0 . It is defined as (retail buy dollar volume – retail
sell dollar volume)/(retail buy dollar volume + retail sell dollar volume), and is evaluated at day 0. The
control variables are defined as in Table 3.4. At least 50 observations are required for each daily
regression. Average coefficients and standard errors adjusted for Newey and West (1987) with 5 lags are
reported. Panel A presents the results for the sample that excludes observations with insider trades in the
10 trading days prior to earnings announcements; panel B limits the sample to stocks with below-median
institutional ownership; and panel C limits the sample to stocks with below-median number of analysts.
Panel A: No Insiders
𝑃𝐸𝑆[1,5]𝑖
𝑃𝐸𝑆[2,5]𝑖
𝑃𝐸𝑆[6,20]𝑖
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0
0.055***
0.001
-0.015
(0.017)
(0.017)
(0.009)
Controls
YES
YES
YES
Observations
Average Pseudo R-squared

199,148
0.081

746,047
0.064

Panel B: Low Institutional Ownership
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0
0.031
(0.022)
Controls
YES

0.009
(0.023)
YES

0.009
(0.016)
YES

Observations
Average Pseudo R-squared

94,028
0.071

75,038
0.068

281,904
0.059

Controls

0.044**
(0.021)
YES

0.036
(0.023)
YES

0.040**
(0.016)
YES

Observations
Average Pseudo R-squared

90,713
0.032

72,214
0.030

269,954
0.028

Panel C: Low Number of Analysts
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,0

249,506
0.085

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6. Predicting Earnings Announcement Returns
This table reports regression results relating abnormal returns on and after earnings announcements to
pre-announcement retail trading activity. The dependent variable is 𝐶𝐴𝑅[0,1]𝑖 , which is the cumulative
abnormal stock return over the [0,1] trading period where time 0 is the trading day of the earnings
announcement. Abnormal returns are computed using the sample’s equal-weighted index as the
benchmark. Earnings surprises are put into quintiles by quarter and dummy variables are defined
correspondingly, with 𝐸𝑆1 containing the most negative surprises. Earnings surprises are defined as
the actual earnings minus the I/B/E/S provided median analyst estimate of the earnings. 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦] are
cumulative retail order imbalances from 𝑥 to 𝑦 where daily order imbalances are computed as (retail
buy volume – retail sell volume)/(retail buy volume + retail sell volume), and volumes are expressed in
the number of shares traded in stock 𝑖. Fuller-Battese (1974) corrected t-statistics are in parentheses.
[−10, −1]
[−10, −1]
[−60, −1]
[−60, −1]
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
0.064***
0.055***
0.090***
0.063**
(3.39)
(3.01)
(3.11)
(2.28)
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
-0.025***
-0.041***
-0.005***
-0.012***
(-6.42)
(-11.02)
(-3.24)
(-7.78)
𝐸𝑆1
-4.728***
-4.722***
(-46.53)
(-46.39)
𝐸𝑆2
-2.256***
-2.258***
(-24.67)
(-24.67)
𝐸𝑆4
1.649***
1.643***
(17.34)
(17.26)
𝐸𝑆5
3.054***
3.044***
(30.17)
(30.03)
Intercept
0.042
0.484***
0.043
0.509***
(0.83)
(6.83)
(0.83)
(7.12)
Observations

79,314

79,314

79,314

79,314
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Table 3.7. Robustness Checks on Predicting Earnings Announcement Returns
This table reports regression results relating abnormal returns on and after earnings announcements to
pre-announcement retail trading activity. The dependent variable is 𝐶𝐴𝑅[0,1]𝑖 , which is the cumulative
abnormal stock return over the [0,1] trading period where time 0 is the trading day of the earnings
announcement. Earnings surprises are put into quintiles by quarter and dummy variables are defined
correspondingly, with 𝐸𝑆1 containing the most negative surprises. Earnings surprises are defined as the
actual earnings minus the I/B/E/S provided median analyst estimate of the earnings. 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦] are
cumulative retail order imbalances from 𝑥 to 𝑦 where daily order imbalances are computed as (retail buy
volume – retail sell volume)/(retail buy volume + retail sell volume), and volumes are expressed in the
number of shares traded in stock 𝑖. Panel A shows the results for the sample that excludes observations
with insider trades in the 10 trading days prior to earnings announcements. Panel B excludes the last
trading day before earnings announcements in the independent variables, i.e., for [𝑥, 𝑦] equal to
[−10, −2] and [−60, −2]. Fuller-Battese (1974) corrected t-statistics are in parentheses.
Panel A: No Insiders
[−10, −1]
[−10, −1]
[−60, −1]
[−60, −1]
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
0.069***
0.061***
0.096***
0.074**
(3.51)
(3.26)
(3.18)
(2.55)
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
-0.023***
-0.039***
-0.006***
-0.012***
(-5.44)
(-9.83)
(-3.39)
(-7.63)
𝐸𝑆1
-4.725***
-4.722***
(-44.44)
(-44.35)
𝐸𝑆2
-2.230***
-2.232***
(-22.99)
(-22.99)
𝐸𝑆4
1.618***
1.613***
(15.98)
(15.91)
𝐸𝑆5
3.057***
3.047***
(28.73)
(28.60)
Intercept
0.006
0.458***
0.010
0.484***
(0.12)
(6.16)
(0.18)
(6.46)
Observations
71,105
71,105
71,105
71,105
Panel B: No Day -1
[−10, −2]
[−10, −2]
[−60, −2]
[−60, −2]
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
0.053***
0.050***
0.064*
0.051*
(2.64)
(2.61)
(1.95)
(1.65)
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
-0.025***
-0.041***
-0.005***
-0.012***
(-6.41)
(-11.02)
(-3.28)
(-7.81)
𝐸𝑆1
-4.728***
-4.722***
(-46.52)
(-46.39)
𝐸𝑆2
-2.256***
-2.258***
(-24.67)
(-24.67)
𝐸𝑆4
1.650***
1.644***
(17.35)
(17.28)
𝐸𝑆5
3.056***
3.046***
(30.19)
(30.05)
Intercept
0.509***
0.484***
0.045
0.509***
(7.13)
(6.83)
(0.87)
(7.13)
Observations
79,314
79,314
79,314
79,314
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.8. Predicting Post-Earnings Announcement Returns
This table reports regression results relating abnormal returns after earnings announcements to preannouncement retail trading activity. The dependent variable is 𝐶𝐴𝑅[2,61]𝑖 , which is the cumulative
abnormal stock return over the [2,61] trading period where time 0 is the trading day of the earnings
announcement. Abnormal returns are computed using the sample’s equal-weighted index as the
benchmark. Earnings surprises are put into quintiles by quarter and dummy variables are defined
correspondingly, with 𝐸𝑆1 containing the most negative surprises. Earnings surprises are defined as the
actual earnings minus the I/B/E/S provided median analyst estimate of the earnings. 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦] are
cumulative retail order imbalances from 𝑥 to 𝑦 where daily order imbalances are computed as (retail buy
volume – retail sell volume)/(retail buy volume + retail sell volume), where volumes are expressed in
the number of shares traded in stock 𝑖. Fuller-Battese (1974) corrected t-statistics are in parentheses.
[−10, −1]
[−10, −1]
[−60, −1]
[−60, −1]
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
0.164***
0.160***
0.145**
0.141**
(3.91)
(3.82)
(2.26)
(2.20)
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
-0.068***
-0.069***
-0.050***
-0.050***
(-7.91)
(-8.02)
(-14.26)
(-14.31)
𝐸𝑆1
-0.103
-0.276
(-0.43)
(-1.16)
𝐸𝑆2
-1.019***
-1.076***
(-4.77)
(-5.06)
𝐸𝑆4
-0.284
-0.300
(-1.28)
(-1.36)
𝐸𝑆5
0.912***
0.806***
(3.82)
(3.40)
Intercept
-0.182
-0.08
0.01
0.174
(-1.34)
(-0.45)
(0.08)
(0.99)
Observations

79,314

79,314

79,314

79,314

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.9. Robustness Checks on Predicting Post-Earnings Announcement Returns
This table reports regression results relating abnormal returns after earnings announcements to preannouncement retail trading activity. The dependent variable is 𝐶𝐴𝑅[2,61]𝑖 , which is the cumulative
abnormal stock return over the [2,61] trading period where time 0 is the trading day of the earnings
announcement. Earnings surprises are put into quintiles by quarter and dummy variables are defined
correspondingly, with 𝐸𝑆1 containing the most negative surprises. Earnings surprises are defined as the
actual earnings minus the I/B/E/S provided median analyst estimate of the earnings. 𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦] are
cumulative retail order imbalances from 𝑥 to 𝑦 where daily order imbalances are computed as (retail buy
volume – retail sell volume)/(retail buy volume + retail sell volume), where volumes are expressed in
the number of shares traded in stock 𝑖. Panel A excludes observations with insider trades in the 10 trading
days prior to earnings announcements. Panel B excludes the last trading day before earnings
announcements in the independent variables, i.e., for [𝑥, 𝑦] equal to [−10, −2] and [−60, −2]. FullerBattese (1974) corrected t-statistics are in parentheses.
[−10, −1]
[−10, −1]
[−60, −1]
[−60, −1]
Panel A: No Insiders
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
0.188***
0.184***
0.178***
0.174***
(4.30)
(4.23)
(2.66)
(2.60)
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
-0.061***
-0.062***
-0.049***
-0.050***
(-6.60)
(-6.77)
(-13.43)
(-13.55)
𝐸𝑆1
-0.249
-0.415*
(-0.99)
(-1.66)
𝐸𝑆2
-1.049***
-1.106***
(-4.62)
(-4.89)
𝐸𝑆4
-0.288
-0.302
(-1.21)
(-1.28)
𝐸𝑆5
0.952***
0.859***
(3.78)
(3.43)
Intercept
-0.079
0.44
-0.073
0.275
(-0.54)
(0.23)
(-0.50)
(1.47)
Observations
Panel B: No Day -1
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]

71,105
[−10, −2]

Intercept

-0.176
(-1.30)

0.161***
(3.64)
-0.069***
(-8.02)
-0.103
(-0.43)
-1.018***
(-4.77)
-0.282
(-1.27)
0.917***
(3.84)
-0.075
(-0.42)

Observations

79,314

79,314

𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]

0.164***
(3.70)
-0.068***
(-7.91)

71,105
[−10, −2]

𝐸𝑆1
𝐸𝑆2
𝐸𝑆4
𝐸𝑆5

71,105
[−60, −2]

71,105
[−60, −2]

0.137*
(1.91)
-0.050***
(-14.28)

0.136*
(1.88)
-0.050***
(-14.32)
-0.276
(-1.16)
-1.075***
(-5.05)
-0.297
(-1.34)
0.810***
(3.42)
0.177
(1.01)

0.015
(0.12)
79,314

79,314

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

100

5

0.02

3
2
1
0
-1
-2

0
-0.02

-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

4

ROIB(PES) - ROIB(NPES) (%)

0.04

-10
-9
-8
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Return(PES) - Return(NPES) (%)

6

-0.04
-0.06
-0.08
-0.1
-0.12

Days around earnings announcement
Large

Medium

Small

-0.14

Days around earnings announcement
Large

Medium

Small

Figure 3.1. Cumulative market-adjusted returns and retail order imbalances around earnings
announcements
Market-adjusted returns are defined as stock returns minus the average equal-weighted return on the stocks
in the sample. Retail order imbalances (ROIB) are defined as (retail buy volume – retail sell volume)/(retail
buy volume + retail sell volume), where volumes are expressed in the number of shares traded. Earnings
announcements are separated into positive and nonpositive earnings surprises (PES and NPES), where
positive surprises are those where the actual earnings were higher than the median analyst estimate provided
by I/B/E/S. Stocks are separated into small, medium and large stocks; large firms are defined as firms in
the top three deciles of market capitalization as of the end of the previous year; medium firms are those in
deciles 5 to 7; small firms are those in the bottom 4 deciles. The figures encompass the 21-day event window
period centered on day 0, defined as the trading day on which announcements have been made or the first
subsequent trading day, if announcements were made outside of trading hours. The left figure shows the
differences between average cumulative market-adjusted returns to stocks with positive and nonpositive
earnings surprises, separated by market capitalization group; The right figure shows the differences between
average cumulative retail order imbalances of stocks with positive and nonpositive earnings surprises,
separated by market capitalization group.
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Table 3.A1. Panel A results of Table 3.5 (Predicting Earnings Announcement Returns) excluding
earnings announcements in Compustat that could not be matched to I/B/E/S.
[−10, −1]
[−10, −1]
[−60, −1]
[−60, −1]
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
0.058***
0.050**
0.087***
0.054*
(2.67)
(2.43)
(2.84)
(1.87)
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
-0.013***
-0.034***
-0.004**
-0.013***
(-2.98)
(-7.97)
(-2.06)
(-7.16)
𝐸𝑆1
-4.925***
-4.927***
(-41.79)
(-41.77)
𝐸𝑆2
-2.425***
-2.427***
(-23.19)
(-23.21)
𝐸𝑆4
1.491***
1.490***
(13.80)
(13.79)
𝐸𝑆5
2.870***
2.863***
(24.52)
(24.45)
Intercept
-0.023
0.661***
-0.020
0.696***
(-0.41)
(7.17)
(-0.35)
(7.50)
Observations

66,940

66,940

66,940

66,940

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.A2. Panel A results of Table 3.6 (Predicting Post-Earnings Announcement Returns)
excluding earnings announcements in Compustat that could not be matched to I/B/E/S.
[−10, −1]
[−10, −1]
[−60, −1]
[−60, −1]
𝑅𝑂𝐼𝐵𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]
0.141***
0.136***
0.149**
0.143*
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,[𝑥,𝑦]

(2.96)
-0.075***
(-7.87)

𝐸𝑆1
𝐸𝑆2
𝐸𝑆4
𝐸𝑆5
Intercept

0.128
(1.09)

Observations

66,940

(2.85)
-0.076***
(-7.91)
0.514*
(1.89)
-0.532**
(-2.23)
0.216
(0.87)
1.498***
(5.54)
0.047
(0.21)
66,940

(2.03)
-0.046***
(-11.58)

0.022
(0.10)

(1.94)
-0.046***
(-11.55)
0.216
(0.80)
-0.618***
(-2.60)
0.157
(0.64)
1.265***
(4.74)
0.132
(0.64)

66,940

66,940

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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